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From Cotton Curtain to Iron Curtain: Black Americans' Reaction to The Hungarian 
Crisis of 1956 and 1957 (112 pp.) 
This thesis examines the reaction of black Americans to the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 
and 1957. While most Americans poured forth their sympathy for the Hungarian victims 
of the Soviet Union's brutal invasion, black Americans called attention to both past and 
contemporary examples of aggression against the peoples of Asia and Africa. Black 
Americans also pointed to their own fight for equality, and the indifference and violent 
resistance that it so often encotmtered. Chapter I of this thesis examines the reaction of 
black Americans in light of their own unique historical experience. Chapter II provides 
an overall background to the Hungarian Crisis, a discussion of the Eisenhower 
administration's decision making during the Crisis, and an examination of the generally 
sympathetic response on the part of the mainstream press and general public. Chapter III 
provides the main body of this thesis. This chapter utilizes major black newspapers, the 
works of prominent black leaders, and letters sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
present the often bitter and angry reaction of black Americans to their nation's decision to 
transport and provide asylimi to some 32,000 Hungarian refugees. Underlying black 
Americans' unfavorable reaction to America's efforts to save the Hungarian refugees was 
their belief that their nation did not care unless the victims of oppression happened to be 
white. In addition, black Americans worried what the influx of a such a large number of 
white immigrants would do to their only recently acquired, and still very tenuous, 
socioeconomic and political rights. 
Director: Michael Mayer 
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INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOURCES 
The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 produced a wave of American sympathy unlike 
few other foreign events had before, or have since. The United States and the world 
watched in horror as the Soviet Union sent in troops to crush the rebellion sweeping 
through this small satellite nation. The Eisenhower administration first sought to employ 
the United Nations and personal diplomacy to secure the removal of Soviet troops. When 
these efforts failed and the Soviets continued their invasion, the Eisenhower 
administration was left wdth a difficult choice. Since the end of World War II, America 
had hoped for the eventual "liberation" of the Soviet dominated nations of Eastern 
Europe. Some critics even argued that the United States had directly incited the 
Himgarian Rebellion in an attempt to achieve this eventual end. However, by providing 
military aid to Hungary's rebels, America would risk provoking an all-out war, or even a 
potential nuclear holocaust. For this reason, and others, the Eisenhower administration 
ruled out the use of force on behalf of Hungary. Instead, the administration proposed that 
thousands of Hungarian refugees be provided transportation to and refuge in the United 
States. This decision launched one of the most massive refugee relief efforts ever 
undertaken by the American government. The majority within the mainstream press and 
general public not only accepted this decision, they actively participated in the refugee 
effort and even pushed for greater action on the part of their government. 
The unique history and experience of black Americans, however, led them to a 
very different perspective on the Hungarian Crisis. By 1956, when Americans began 
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their incredible outpouring of aid, praise, and sympathy for Hungary, black Americans 
had been waiting almost a century for a similar response to their struggle and plight. 
Black Americans had willingly answered their nation's call to go overseas and help save 
oppressed peoples in World War 1 and World War II. In both wars, black Americans' 
desire to serve their country was met with hostility and discrimination. While black 
Americans did achieve some substantial gains as a result of their participation in these 
conflicts, particularly World War II, these advances fell far short of the full and equal 
citizenship they had hoped for. Their nation's failure to grant them the privileges due 
them as citizens left many black Americans pessimistic about their role in American 
society. 
With the emergence of the Cold War, however, black Americans once again lent 
their support to their nation. Like most other Americans of the 1950s, black Americans 
adopted the prevailing anti-communist stance of the day. However, in spite of their past 
and continued loyalty, the demands of black Americans for equality were often viewed 
suspiciously as being "communist inspired." Then, after many legal battles, the Supreme 
Court ruled segregated schools imconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). 
Once again, the hopes of black Americans soared. However, two year later in 1956, 
segregation in education and elsewhere remained a cruel reality. Instead of receiving 
support, or even grudging compliance, Brown v. Board of Education touched off a violent 
backlash and widespread resistance to desegregation. 
The growing bitterness and frustration of black Americans would play an 
important role in their reaction to their nation's offers of aid and support to the 
-> 
Hungarians, particularly the decision to assist thousands of Hungarian refugees in 
emigrating to the United States. The black community was not so much angry with the 
Himgarians themselves, as with the intense display of sympathy and support on the part 
of the United States government and the American people as a whole. Americans' 
support for the Hungarians came at a time when many individuals and groups, in and out 
of government, displayed indifference, or sometimes even outright hostility, to the fight 
against racism. Black Americans, understandably, felt hurt and betrayed that their own 
government and fellow citizens seemed to care more about the plight of foreigners 
thousands of miles away, than they did about the violence perpetrated against the 
American Negro in the South. 
In addition to racism at home, black Americans resented what they saw as 
American support for imperialism overseas. As black Americans increasingly began to 
identify their plight with that of colored nations arovmd the world, they began to view a 
clear racial line in both the foreign and domestic policies of the United States. Black 
Americans still remembered what they perceived as the rather indifferent attitude of their 
nation toward Benito Mussolini's brutal invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s. They also 
pointed to the continued indifference on the part of many Americans to more 
contemporary examples of brutality against colored peoples in Suez, Kenya, Algeria, and 
South Afi-ica. 
Added to their perception that their nation did not care unless the victims of 
oppression happened to be white, was black Americans' historical memory of the 
negative impact of white immigration on the status of the American Negro. In the early 
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years of industrialization, black Americans faced intense competition for employment 
opportimities with recently arrived immigrants from Europe. In this struggle, black 
Americans usually found themselves on the losing end. Much of the economic progress 
achieved by black Americans came as a direct result of the sudden decline in European 
immigration brought about by World War I. Their unpleasant experiences with European 
immigration left a lingering strain of nativism within the black community. This 
nativism would reemerge in full force wdth the Himgarian Crisis. By the 1950s, black 
Americans had made some important, though limited, advances. Thus, they greeted the 
news that thousands of Hungarian refugees would soon arrive on their nation's shores 
with fear and suspicion. Black Americans worried what the influx of a such a large 
number of white immigrants would do to their only recently acquired, and still very 
tenuous, socioeconomic and political gains. 
This thesis primarily utilizes articles, editorials, and statements found throughout 
the black press. It also draws on the works of prominent black leaders and letters sent to 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower by black Americans opposing Hungarian refugee relief. 
When arguing that these sources represented black opinion, it is recognized that they 
leave out the very poor, illiterate, and rural blacks who did not have access to major 
newspapers and probably did not consider writing Eisenhower personally. It recognizes 
that it only encompasses the opinions of black leaders, editors and columnists for major 
newspapers, or those black Americans who cared enough and were able to take the time 
to either write to their newspaper or Eisenhower himself. Within these constraints, 
however, it seeks to represent a diversity of sources of black opinion. It includes 
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Southern as well as Northern newspapers. It further includes black newspapers which 
were traditionally Democratic and those which supported the Republican party. In 
addition, it also discusses the few cases where black Americans did voice support for 
and/or participate in Hungarian refugee relief. 
While there are certainly some problems with arguing that the views of prominent 
black leaders, improvement organizations, and those voiced in major newspapers 
represented those of all black Americans, it remains reasonable to argue that they did in 
fact represent the opinions of a large majority of black Americans in the 1950s. By the 
1950s, America's black population had gone from being overwhelmingly Southem and 
rural to Northern and urban. Even those blacks who remained in the South began 
increasingly to migrate to urban centers like Atlanta, Georgia. Urbanization played a 
vital role in increasing the power and influence of the black press and improvement 
organizations, like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP). Prior to the urbanization of black America, improvement organizations and 
black newspapers tended to speak to a very small minority of elite black leaders. 
However, by the end of World War II, the circulation of black newspapers and 
membership in the NAACP had reached the hundreds of thousands. 
Urbanization not only allowed institutions like the NAACP and the black press to 
expand their influence, it also, in tum, allowed increasing numbers of average black 
Americans to influence the direction and policy of such organizations. The NAACP, 
which depended on political support and cash donations from thousands of black 
Americans from all walks of life, could not simply ignore the views of such individuals. 
By the 1950s, the black press had moved from being primarily supported by subsidies 
provided by a limited number of private individuals and organizations, to depending 
almost entirely on sales and subscriptions. The urbani2ation of black America required 
that its leaders, organizations, and media now remain more cognizant of the views and 
issues of importance to average black Americans. By the middle of the 1950s, these 
institutions both reflected and helped mold the opinions of a large majority, if not all, 
black Americans. As such, they stand as valid and reliable sources through which to 
examine the opinions of black Americans in generail, and to the Hungarian Crisis in 
particular. 
CHAPTER I: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL FACTORS 
CONDITIONING THE RESPONSE OF BLACK AMERICANS TO THE 
HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956 AND 1957 
The often angry and bitter reaction of black Americans to the United States' 
Hungarian refugee relief effort of 1956-1957 can best be understood in light of the 
historical experience of black Americans. The urbanization of black America allowed for 
the growth of key institutions, including the Negro press and improvement societies. 
However, urbanization also brought black Americans into increased contact and 
competition with European immigrants. The experiences of black Americans and 
immigrants in the early years of industrialization left a bitter and suspicious attitude 
toward white iimnigration on the part of many black Americans. The experience of 
World War I and World War II also helped condition the reaction of black Americans to 
arrival of the Hungarian reftigees. Throughout these conflicts, black Americans 
sacrificed a great deal. However, despite the gains they did achieve, the social, political, 
and economic status of black Americans continued to lag far behind that of white 
Americans. By 1956 the Cold War had set in, the Afro-Asian block was coming into its 
own, and the fioisfration of black Americans was on the rise. In addition to their 
frustration with their own condition, black Americans came increasingly to believe that 
their nation only cared about oppression overseas when it involved a white European 
nation. 
Black Americans first began moving North in substantial numbers in the decades 
following the Civil War. They came in search of better employment opportunities, 
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greater freedom of movement, and to escape the often violent resistance to the exercise of 
their newly acquired rights. This urbanization created the necessary conditions for the 
emergence of a number of black newspapers and improvement organizations. The late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a tremendous growth in the niunber of black 
periodicals. The founding of the Baltimore Afro-American came in 1892; the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide in 1899; Boston Globe in 1901; and the Chicago Defender and 
Pittsburgh Courier in 1905. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century also gave 
rise to organizations like the National Association of Colored Women in 1895; The 
National Business League in 1900; the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) in 1909; and the National Urban League (NUL) in 1911. 
These and countless smaller organizations provided a format in which black Americans 
could vent their frustration at their continued discrimination and formulate strategies by 
which to improve their condition. Throughout the twentieth century, the Negro Press 
and improvement societies would play a crucial role in both molding and giving voice to 
the opinion of black Americans.' 
While the migration of black Americans from the rural South to the urban areas of 
'John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, 
Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 435-436 & 444-451; E. Franklin 
Frazier, The Negro in the United States, Revised Edition (New York: MacMillan, 1957), 
pp. 523-526; Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom: The Story of the NAACP (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Compainy, Inc., 1962), pp. 22-23; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The 
History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 97-98; Arnold M. Rose, The Negro in Postwar America 
(Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith: 1950), pp. 10 & 24-25; and Monroe N. Work 
(ed.), Negro Yearbook: An Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro, 1918-1919 (Alabama; The 
Negro Year Book Publishing Company, 1919), pp, 454-472. 
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the North brought some improvement in their condition, black Americans continued to 
encoimter enormous obstacles in their search economic security. One of the greatest 
constraints on upward mobility for black Americans arose from their intense competition 
for employment and housing with white immigrants. Though immigrants often faced 
discrimination and hostility as well, their status nearly always remained above that of 
black Americans. Most employers expressed preference for immigrant over black 
workers. In addition, many immigrants seemed all too quick to adopt a hostile and racist 
attitude toward American blacks. This social ranking translated into greater economic 
opportunities for the white European immigrants, often at the expense of America's black 
citizens. Black Americans were almost universally excluded from the higher paying 
industrial occupations, and instead, confined to lower paying personal service 
professions. However, in times of economic downturn black Americans faced loss of 
even these occupations to white immigrants. These factors combined to make black 
Americans suspicious and resentful towards European immigration.^ 
The "new immigration" that began in the 1880s ftirther aggravated the animosity 
between America's native blacks and its European immigrants. By the end of the 1870s, 
black Americans had begun to secure some socioeconomic mobility. Black Americans, 
though still severely limited in their opportunities for advancement, began in increasing 
^Herman D. Bloch, The Circle of Discrimination: An Economic and Social Study 
of the Black Man in New York (New York: New York University Press, 1969), pp. 34-46; 
David J. Hell wig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929," 
Journal of Negro History 66 (Summer 1981): pp. 110-127; and Kluger, Simple Justice, 
pp. 88 & 100. 
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numbers to enter industrial positions from which they had previously been excluded. 
However, just as black Americans were on the verge of increased economic 
opportunities, a new wave of immigrants, mostly from Italy and Eastern Europe, arrived 
on America's shores. This new influx of white immigrants presented black Americans 
with even greater competition for unskilled to semi-skilled industrial employment. Fewer 
job opportimities, in turn, slowed the ongoing migration of black Americans to Northern 
urban centers. By 1910, what had been rapidly growing populations of black Americans 
in many Northern cities began to slowly level off.^ 
World War I, however, brought new opportunities for black Americans. Once 
again, they began migrating in large numbers to Northern industrial centers. By 1920, 
330,000 black Americans had migrated either to the Northern or Western areas of the 
United States. This time, however, they had little to no immigrant competition. Almost 
overnight. World War I eliminated nearly all European immigration. World War I also 
generated a booming defense industry and a labor shortage. The lack of immigrant 
competition, combined with the manpower needs of World War I, opened up industrial 
employment opportunities that had previously been entirely out of reach of most black 
Americans. Large numbers of black Americans secured employment in munitions 
factories, steel plants, shipbuilding, foodstuffs, and many other war related industries. A 
particularly striking example of the inroads made by black workers can be seen in 
^John E. Bodnar, "The Impact of the 'New Immigration' on the Black Worker: 
Steelton, Pennsylvania, \%2>0-\92Qr Labor History 17 (Spring 1976): pp. 214-229 and 
Frazier, The Negro in the United States,.^. 190. 
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Pittsburgh's steel industry. In 1910, Pittsburgh's steel plants employed fewer than 100 
black workers. By 1923, this number had skyrocketed to 17,000." 
The Negro press played an important role in persuading Southern blacks to move 
Northward and take advantage of the opportimities afforded by World War I. The 
Christian Recorder declared that "if a million Negroes move North and West...it will be 
one of the greatest things for the Negro since the Emancipation Proclamation."^ The 
overwhelming response to the call to come North created the conditions in which the 
black news media and improvement organizations could expand their influence to larger 
numbers of black Americans. However, the growing importance of the black press also 
generated hostility and suspicion. In some areas of the South, possession of a black 
newspaper meant possible jail time, mob violence, or both. The federal government also 
kept a close eye on the black media. Fearftil of the growing power of the black press, the 
War Department and the Committee on Public Information requested a meeting with 
leading members of the black media. At this meeting, government officials suspiciously 
questioned those present as to just where the black press stood on the war effort. In 
addition, the United States' Attorney General, Mitchell Palmer, placed a number of black 
periodicals on his list of "subversive" organizations. Palmer also had A. Philip 
"Theodore Hemmingway, "Prelude to Change: Black Carolinians in the War 
Years, l9\4-\920" Journal of Negro History 65 (Summer 1980): pp. 212-227; Franklin, 
From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 472-473; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 193 
& 598-599; Hellwig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929, 
p. 110; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 100 & 110-111; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 
1918-1919, vp. 8-12. 
^Quoted in Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9. 
Randolph, editor of The Messenger, arrested for alleged disloyalty.^ 
Rather than encouraging disloyalty or subversion as so often accused, most black 
leaders instead urged their fellow black Americans to remain loyal and do all they could 
to further America's war effort. Through his writings in The Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois 
advised his readers that it was time to "forget our special grievances and close ranks 
shoulder to shoulder with our white citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for 
democracy.'" In May of 1917 the NAACP, meeting with other improvement 
organizations, adopted a series of resolutions which called on black Americans to "join 
heartily in this fight."* In spite of Germany's repeated efforts to sway the loyalty of 
America's black citizens, particularly those of Southern origin, black Americans 
remained relatively indifferent to German propaganda.® Thomas Lykes, a black poet 
®August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto: An 
Interpretive History of American Negroes (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), pp. 191-
192; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 462-463 & 472; Frazier, The Negro in the 
United States, pp. 509-512 & 527-528; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 47-48; and Work 
(ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 8-10. 
'Quoted in Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 476 and Paul Gordon Lauren, 
Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1988), p. 73. 
^Quoted in Jane L. and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the 
Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.). Black 
Labor in America (Westport; Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 115. 
'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 464-465, Hemmingway, "Prelude to 
Change," pp. 217-218; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 45-46; Lauren, Power and 
Prejudice, p. 73; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 193-194; Scheiber, 
"The Wilson Administration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans 1917-
1918," in Cantor (comp.), Black Labor in America, pp. 114-119; and Work (ed.), Negro 
Yearbook 1918-1919, pp. 45-46. 
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writing from South Carolina, gave somewhat comical expression to the loyal intentions of 
black Americans: "Two lands alone I know and love [o]ur country and the one 
above...these were his answers to...the enemy...German spy doggone, begone [o]r I will 
smack your face with a liberty bond.'"" 
The massive response to the call of black leaders to "close ranks" and "join 
heartily in this fight" can be seen in the large numbers of average black Americans who 
actively sought out military service. These individuals knew that in order to claim full 
citizenship in America, they had to gain the right to fight for their coimtry. Black 
Americans seldom sought military exemption, and in fact, expressed disappointment and 
resentment when draft boards turned them away. By the time World War I ended, over 
300,000 black Americans had served in their nation's armed forces. When allowed to 
participate in combat, black Americans proved willing to risk their lives to prove their 
loyalty and ability as soldiers. A substantial number of black soldiers received official 
commendation from the French High Command, including the prestigious "Croix de 
Guerre," for bravery in battle." 
Despite their willingness to serve, black soldiers often faced tremendous 
discrimination and hostility in the armed forces. They were excluded entirely from the 
marines and aviation, and allowed to serve only as cooks or messmen in the Navy. In 
'"Quoted in Hemmingway, "Prelude to Change," p. 217. 
"Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 455-470; Hemmingway, "Prelude to 
Change," pp. 214-216; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 45-46; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 
109-110; and Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 193; and Work (ed.), 
Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 98-99 & 215-232. 
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whatever capacity they served, black servicemen encountered menial assignments, slow 
promotions, and almost entire separation from white soldiers. Black soldiers who served 
under white command often endured daily insults and uimecessarily harsh working and 
living conditions. The presence of black soldiers in training camps around the nation also 
met with intense hostility on the part of many local communities. Black soldiers foimd 
themselves excluded from eating and recreational facilities, ridiculed, harassed, and even 
assaulted by white civilians. However, perhaps the most demeaning example of 
discrimination came from the United States govenunent itself. On August 17, 1918 
America's military commander, General Pershing, informed the French High Command 
of the "differing nature" of black American soldiers. Pershing went on to request that 
French military persormel strictly limit their social contact with black American soldiers 
and avoid praising them too profusely.'^ 
Black Americans on the home front demonstrated a similar eagerness to 
contribute to the war effort in spite of continued discrimination. Though World War I 
vastly increased the economic means of many black Americans, they still remained one 
of America's poorest groups of citizens. Despite this lower economic status, however, 
black Americans contributed heavily to the United States' efforts to raise money for the 
war. They were heavily represented in the purchase of Liberty War Bonds and War 
'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 458-461; Hemmingway, "Prelude to 
Change," pp. 215-216; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 38-42; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 
109-110; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 73; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to 
Ghetto, pp. 192-193; Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime 
Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.). Black Labor in 
America, pp. 119-126; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 79-81 & 94-96. 
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Savings Stamps. In addition, as a group, black Americans donated large amounts of time 
and money to organizations like the Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and the United War Work 
Campaign. All told, black Americans contributed over two million dollars to their 
nation's war effort. This massive financial contribution came at a time when the 
administration of Woodrow Wilson did little to respond to the pleas of black leaders to 
step in and take action to stop the lynchings and race riots occurring around the nation.'^ 
The black community had sacrificed along with the rest of America, and naturally 
expected that the end of World War I would bring rewards for their patience, loyalty, and 
service. W.E.B. Du Bois expressed the sentiments of many black Americans when he 
declared: "We return...Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the 
Great Jehovah, we will save it in the U.S.A or know the reason why.'"'* However, despite 
some economic gains as a byproduct of the labor shortage, black Americans received few 
direct returns for their efforts in World War I. When the rewards for their contributions 
did not materialize, the hopeful optimism with which many black Americans had greeted 
World War I rapidly gave way to disillusionment and pessimism over their future as 
American citizens. For black Americans, the discrepancy between Woodrow Wilson's 
pledge to "Make the World Safe for Democracy" and the harsh reality of racism at home 
'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 470-471; Hemmingway, "Prelude to 
Change," pp. 216-217; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 110-111; Meier and Rudwick, From 
Plantation to Ghetto, p. 192; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 45-51. 
'"•Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 99. 
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became increasingly difficult to ignore. 
Black soldiers felt this frustration even more profoundly than those on the home 
front. Their service in France provided them vdth a stark contrast to their lives at home. 
Though their treatment of colonial peoples left much to be desired, the French 
government imposed no racial restrictions on black American soldiers. The French, in 
fact, treated black Americ^ soldiers as heroes, just as they did white American soldiers. 
This social equality and easy mixing of the races came as a shock to many black 
Americans, and forever affected their willingness to accept anything less. As a result of 
their wartime experience, black soldiers returned home with a growing determination to 
not rest imtil their nation accepted them as fiill social, economic, and political equals. It 
was no accident that many of the leaders of the later Civil Rights Movement spent time 
overseas in the United States military.'^ 
World War I also served to increase the knowledge and interest of many 
Americans, including black Americans, in international affairs. While some black 
Americans had always recognized the link between the condition of the American Negro 
and events overseas. World War I deepened this recognition and brought it to an 
'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 476-479; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 
110-113, Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 194-196; Lauren, Power 
and Prejudice, pp. 99-100; and Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime 
Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.), Black Labor in 
America, pp. 135-136. 
'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 476-479; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, 
pp. 45-46; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 110-111; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 99-
100; and Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 194-196. 
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expanded, though still limited, number of black Americans. This increased knowledge of 
world events, in turn, generated a greater sense of identification with colored nations 
around the world. The organization of the first Pan-African Conference by Du Bois and 
the NAACP demonstrated a growing awareness among leading black Americans that 
their success in fighting racism at home depended on the end of racism and imperialism 
everywhere. However, at this point in history, Pan-Africanism remained the purview of a 
relatively small group of elite black leaders. It would take Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 
the 1930s, and later World War II and the Cold War, to bring a more international 
perspective on racism to the majority of black Americans." 
In the years directly following World War I, however, black Americans returned 
to concentrating primarily on domestic issues. One of the most important concerns of 
black Americans in the 1920s was preserving the economic opportunities seciired in 
World War I. Black Americans clearly recognized the link between their socioeconomic 
status and European immigration. This recognition generated strong nativist sentiments 
within the black community. These sentiments can be seen in the words of Philadelphia's 
Christian Recorder: "The Negro...speaks the language...knows the customs...and is 
physically the equal and morally the superior of the immigrant from Europe.'"® The 
understandable desire of black Americans to preserve their economic gains, ironically, led 
'^Franklin Williams, "Blacks and American Foreign Affairs," The Crisis 
(December 1980); pp. 533-538; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 470; Hughes, 
Fight for Freedom, p. 50; and Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 77-79. 
'^Quoted in Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9. 
many to support the efforts of racist organizations, like the Klu Kiux Klan, to tighten 
immigration laws. Black Americans, however, also experienced enormous conflict on the 
immigration issue. While recognizing the economic benefits of ending immigration, 
black Americans felt very uncomfortable with the tendency of others supporting 
inmiigration restrictions to emphasize racial characteristics. For black Americans, the 
solution lay in increasing the percentage of immigrants coming from Asia and Africa, 
while at the same time, reducing the numbers arriving from Europe.'® 
The Great Depression slowed industrialization and urbanization for all Americans, 
including black Americans. However, as a result of the earlier mass migrations of the 
industrial era and World War I, large numbers of black Americans remained concentrated 
in urban areas. In addition, black Americans continued to migrate to the cities, albeit at a 
slower rate than they had in the previous decades. In spite of the Depression, the 
economic and political awareness of urban blacks continued to grow throughout the 
1930s. This growing awareness can be seen in the successful use of economic coercion 
to protest inequitable treatment. Of the numerous black sponsored boycotts of the 1930s, 
St. Louis' "Jobs-for-Negroes" movement and Harlem's "Don't Buy Where You Can't 
Work" or "Buy Black" campaigns drew the most attention and had the greatest impact. 
These and other, similar, boycotts targeted white businesses which, while catering 
primarily to black customers, refiised to employ black workers. Through picketing, word 
of mouth, and news releases, black leaders put the word out that their communities 
'^Hellwig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929," pp. 
110-127 and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9. 
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should immediately discontinue patronage of such businesses. These economic boycotts, 
coming in the midst of the Great Depression, had a devastating effect on white businesses 
which continued to discriminate. In tum, these economic campaigns provided a much 
needed boost to black business.^" 
The 1930s also witnessed an early example of the increasingly important role of 
the Negro vote. In 1930 Herbert Hoover nominated John J. Parker, a little known federal 
judge, to the Supreme Court. The NAACP, however, learned that earlier in his career 
Parker had made racist statements regarding the participation of black Americans in the 
democratic process. The NAACP first attempted to discover if Parker still held such 
views. When Parker failed to disavow his earlier statements, the NAACP mobilized 
black voters to come out against his nomination. The NAACP recognized that if enough 
black Americans, particularly those concentrated in Northern urban areas, put pressure on 
their Congressmen to oppose Parker's nomination, they could keep him off the Supreme 
Court. Though other forces, particularly labor, played a role as well, the defeat of the 
Parker nomination clearly indicated the growing power of the Negro vote.^' 
During the 1930s, the NAACP also stepped up its efforts to secure greater 
employment and educational opportunities for black Americans. The NAACP challenged 
the discriminatory employment practices of the Tennessee Valley Project. The NAACP's 
^"Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 539-540 eind Hughes, Fight for 
Freedom, pp. 81-82 
^'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 529; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 74-
75; and Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 141-144. 
20 
Thurgood Marshall launched a series of court battles on behalf of equal pay for black 
teachers. However, of all its diverse activities during the 1930s, the NAACP's attack on 
the legal principles upholding segregation had the greatest long term impact. Since the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which upheld Louisiana's Public 
Accommodation Law requiring separate accommodations for black passengers, the legal 
doctrine of "separate but equal" had stood firm. However, beginning in the 1930s, the 
NAACP's legal staff, concluded that Plessy might be best challenged by attacking not the 
separateness, but rather the inequality, of various educational and transportation facilities 
throughout the South. The NAACP could easily point to case after case where facilities 
reserved for blacks remained clearly unequal. Throughout the 1930s, the NAACP would 
successfully argue a number of cases before the Supreme Court based on this formula. 
The NAACP also pointed to the possibility that racial separation could, in the future, be 
challenged as inherently unequal. The activities of the NAACP, continuing even in the 
midst of the Depression, demonstrated the growing political consciousness of black 
Americans. Their legal battles also laid the groundwork for Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954).22 
In addition to actively seeking to improve their own status, black Americans in 
the 1930s also concerned themselves with their colored brethren in the small African 
nation of Ethiopia. For black Americans, Ethiopia stood as the ultimate symbol of the 
achievement of colored people. Of all the African nations, only Ethiopia had remained 
^"Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 74-75 & 134-139 and Kluger, Simple Justice, 
pp. 131-138, 163-165,168-172, & 186-195. 
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independent after the onslaught of European imperialism. In December of 1934, fighting 
between Italian and Ethiopian troops broke out. It became increasingly clear that 
Mussolini intended to use this fighting as a pretext to invade Ethiopia. Black Americans 
desperately sought to convince their government to do something to prevent this 
impending invasion. While many Americans may have felt some sympathy for Ethiopia, 
the intense fear of another world war led many Americans to press their government to 
stay completely out of this conflict. Instead of initiating action on behalf of Ethiopia, the 
United States government passed neutrality legislation, instituted an arms embargo, and 
looked the other way as Mussolini proceeded with his merciless invasion. 
When they failed to move their government toward favorable action on behalf of 
Ethiopia and the dreaded invasion came, black Americans took numerous steps to provide 
aid and comfort to the Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression. They sent resolutions to 
the League of Nations, held rallies to raise money, sent medical supplies and personnel, 
and laimched a massive public education campaign. Some black Americans even set out 
to raise volunteer fighting units. Even as black Americans sought to save Ethiopia, 
Italian-Americans instituted their own campaign to raise money for Italy's armies. This 
display of support for Mussolini, who was clearly the aggressor, infiiriated black 
Americans. To register their opposition, thousands of black Americans boycotted 
businesses of Italian-Americans, which they believed were fiirmeling funds to Mussolini. 
The rriass participation among the black community alerted a greater number of black 
Americans to events overseas and enhanced their sense of international racial solidarity. 
It also represented one of the earliest cases where black Americans vocally and forcefully 
22 
opposed the foreign policy of the United States. 
For black Americans, the coming of World War II meant renewed urbanization 
and economic opportunities. Once again, large numbers of black Americans began 
migrating from Southern rural areas to urban areas in the North and West. In many ways, 
this migration looked very similar to the earlier migrations of black Americans. 
However, the numbers of black Americans leaving the South during World War II far 
exceeded what had come before. Despite the earlier migrations, two-thirds of America's 
black population still lived in the South in 1940. The vast majority of these Southern 
blacks still lived in isolated rural areas and worked in low paying agricultural 
occupations. Between 1941 and 1945 nearly one million black Americans left these rural 
areas in search of industrial employment. The labor shortage created by World War II 
enabled large numbers of these migrants to secure the employment they sought. As a 
direct result of World War II, the estimated number of black Americans working in 
manufacturing or related industries rose by 600,000.^'* 
^^Jake Miller, The Black Presence in American Foreign Affairs (Washington, 
D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 247-248; Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising 
Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 37-53; Red Ross, "Black Americans and Italo-Ethiopian 
Relief 1935-1936," Ethiopian Observer 15, no. 2 (1972): pp. 122-131; and Lauren, 
Power and Prejudice, pp. 119-120. 
^"Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," 
Journal of American History 55 (June 1968): pp. 90-106; Jessie Parkhurst Guzman (ed.), 
Negro Year Book: A Review of Events Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946 (Alabama: The 
Department of Records and Research Tuskegee Institute, 1947), pp. 134-136; John 
Modell, Marc Goulden, and Sigurdur Magnusson, "World War II in the Lives of Black 
Americans: Some Findings and an Interpretation," Journal of American History 76 
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As in World War I, black Americans faced discrimination and hostility in their 
efforts to secure employment in America's war industries. During the early years of 
World War II, defense plants either turned black Americans away or placed them in low 
paid menial occupations. For example, in 1940 the rapidly expanding aircraft industry 
enunciated its policy that: "The Negro will be considered only as janitors and in other 
similar capacities."^^ Hostility towards the employment of black Americans in war 
industries also sparked race riots around the nation. One of the worst of such riots 
occurred in Detroit, Michigan. The beginnings of this riot lay in a strike at a Packard 
factory making jet bomber engines for the war effort. In protest against the employment 
of black workers, over twenty thousand white workers walked off the job. One striker 
was reported to have declared: "I'd rather see Hitler and Hirohito win the war than work 
beside a nigger on the assembly line."^® The strike aggravated the already tense racial 
climate in Detroit. By June of 1942, these elevated racial tensions erupted into a riot 
which left 34 people dead and around a million dollars of property damaged.^' 
(December 1989): pp. 838-848; Neil A. Wynn, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
the American Negro," Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 2 (1971): pp. 42-53; 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 597; and Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 
pp. 196 & 214-218. 
^^Quoted in Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," p. 91. 
^^Quoted in Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 95-96. 
^^Dalfiume "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 91-106; 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 95-98; Frazier, The Negro In the United States, 
pp. 606 & 613; Guzman (ed.), Negro Year Book, 1941-1946, pp. 349-350; Hughes, Fight 
for Freedom, pp. 95-98; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 227-228; Meier and Rudwick, From 
Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 217-219; and Wynn, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
In spite of such examples of resistance toward their employment in war industries, 
black Americans had far greater success in fighting employment discrimination in World 
War II than they had in World War I. The increased power of black Americans to fight 
discrimination can be seen in the March on Washington Movement. Even before 
America entered the war, A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters, threatened to lead thousands of black workers in a massive march on the 
nation's capitol in an effort to secure more equitable treatment in the nation's defense 
industries. The prospect of such a march presented President Franklin D. Roosevelt with 
a potentially embarrassing display of low morale on America's home front. Roosevelt 
urged Randolph to think of America's international image, and begged him to call of the 
march. Initially, Randolph stood his ground and refused to do any such thing. However, 
after extensive bargaining, Randolph and Roosevelt reached an agreement. In return for 
Randolph calling off the scheduled march, Roosevelt issued Executive Order #8002, 
which forbade discrimination in government employment and in companies receiving 
government contracts. Roosevelt also set up the Fair Employment Practice Committee 
(FEPC) to overseas the enforcement of this order. While the FEPC had little real power, 
it did provide some increased economic opportunities for black Americans.^^ 
the American Negro," p. 46. 
^^Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 98-99; 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 578-579; Frazier, The Negro in the United 
States, pp. 631-614; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 85-86; Meier and Rudwick, From 
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The experience of black Americans in the armed forces during World War II 
resembled the somewhat mixed bag of substantial advances mixed with continued 
discrimination that characterized their search for equality on the home front. During 
World War II, black Americans had far greater opportunities for military service than 
they had in the previous war. The Selective Service Act of 1940 contained an important 
amendment forbidding discrimination in the drafting and training of servicemen. Though 
frequently ignored, this clause represented a crucial step toward official condemnation of 
racial discrimination in military life. Unlike in the previous war, black officers received 
training at the same facilities and on an integrated basis with white officers. In addition, 
the Navy, Marines, and Army Air Corp, all of which had previously either excluded black 
Americans entirely or confined them to non-combat areas, accepted black Americans into 
general service. In January of 1945 the War Department, acting in response to the 
desperate need for infantrymen during the Battle of the Bulge, announced that a number 
of Negro infantry platoons would be integrated into previously all white units and 
shipped to fight on German soil. Though a temporary wartime measure, this 
announcement provided black soldiers with an invaluable chance to prove themselves.^' 
At the conclusion of the fighting, the War Department declared that the Negro platoons 
had "established themselves as fighting men no less courageous than their white 
^'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 580-92; Gimnan (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 
1941-1946, pp. 351-358, 361 & 368-372; Kluger, Simple Justice, p. 226; Meier and 
Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 218-219; and Wynn, "The Impact of the 
Second World War on the American Negro," pp. 44-46. 
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comrades."^" 
Despite their many gains, black servicemen in World War II still faced 
considerable discrimination. Though officially welcomed in integrated white training 
schools, black Americans often found it difficult to get the necessary recommendations 
from their commanding officers. In addition, though black Americans had gained the 
right to serve in all branches of the United States' armed forces, their admission remained 
on a segregated basis. Army command also deemed all black newspapers subversive and 
banned their presence on army bases and facilities. The Red Cross' separation of blood 
according to the race of the donor and recipient provided yet another example of official, 
institutional racism. As in World War I, the presence of black servicemen continued to 
generate hostility on the part of some white civilians. Hostile white civilians once again 
harassed, beat, and sometimes even murdered black servicemen. The most galling 
examples of discrimination came when Jim Crow eating and recreational facilities 
continued to deny access to black soldiers, at the same time they provided such services 
to German prisoners of war. This forever imprinted on the minds of many black 
Americans that their nation favored white foreigners, even if they be the enemy, over its 
own black citizens.^' 
The improved status of black Americans during and after World War II resulted, 
^"Quoted in Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 586. 
^'Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 91-92; 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 589-591; Guzman (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1941-
1946, pp. 351-352, & 372; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 91-95; and Kluger, Simple 
Justice, p. 226. 
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in part, from a new, more activist approach to achieving racial equality. During World 
War I, black Americans, while never forgetting their own fight for equality, patiently 
waited and remained optimistic that the end of the War would bring them their long-
awaited chance to improve their status in American society. Having failed to acquire the 
full and equal benefits of American life, black Americans entered World War II with a far 
more skeptical and impatient outlook. While still remaining loyal, the Negro press and 
improvement agencies highlighted the continued existence of racism to a far greater 
extent. Black Americans also vowed that this time aroimd they would not wait until the 
end of the war to wage their fight for equality; They would begin immediately. This new 
approach became crystallized in the Pittsburgh Courier's now famous "Double V" 
editorial of February 14, 1942. This editorial declared that black Americans would 
simultaneously fight for "victories over our enemies at home and victory over our 
enemies on the battlefields abroad."^^ This increasingly vocal approach of the black 
community made their demands for equality harder for America to ignore.^^ 
World War II created a favorable climate in which black Americans could press 
their demands. Even more so than World War I, World War II was a total modem war. 
Such a war necessitated the fiill participation and support of all American citizens. 
^^Quoted in Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," p. 96. 
^^Ralph N. Davis, "The Negro Newspapers and The War," Sociology and Social 
Research, 27 (May-June 1943): pp. 372-380; Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the 
Negro Revolution," pp. 91-106; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 598-600; 
Guzman (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1941-1946, pp. 386-87, and Lauren, Power and 
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Eleanor Roosevelt, a longtime advocate of civil rights, pointed out that "the nation cannot 
expect colored people to feel that the United States is worth defending if the Negro 
continues to be treated as he is now."^'* In addition, the horrific culmination of Hitler's 
racism made it increasingly difficult to dismiss racism within the United States. The 
clear irony of fighting to defeat the definitive example of racism overseas while 
continuing to ignore racism at home became too obvious and disconcerting for many 
Americans to ignore. This growing awareness of racism could also be found throughout 
the international community. The growing power and visibility of the United States in 
international affairs, combined with the heightened awareness of race, further 
necessitated that America take steps to solve its racial problems. By failing to do so, 
America left too many perfect propaganda opportunities by which its enemies could 
attack its credibility as a moral leader.^^ 
While the rest of the world turned a critical eye toward the racial problems in the 
United States, black Americans looked hopefully toward the newly emerging nations of 
the Afro-Asian block. Black Americans had long felt a deep empathy with colored 
people struggling to free themselves from white rule. This sense of identification with 
colored people in other lands can be seen as early as World War I and Du Bois' 
^''Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 140. 
^^Roy Wilkins "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in Raymond W. Logan (ed.), 
What the Negro Wants (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 113-
115; Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 96; Franklin, From 
Slavery to Freedom, pp. 592 &. 599; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 12-13; Lauren, Power 
and Prejudice, pp. 136-143 & 163-164; Rose, The Negro in Postwar America, pp. 13-14; 
and Wynn "The Impact of the Second World War on the American Negro," p. 49. 
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organization of the first Pan-African conference. As World War II came to a close, Du 
Bois once again set out to place racism in an international context. When the San 
Francisco Conference met in 1945 to draft the United Nations' charter, Du Bois, acting in 
conjunction with the NAACP and other black leaders and organizations, attempted to 
persuade the American delegation to take a firm stand against imperialism. Du Bois also 
tried unsuccessfiilly to introduce a proposal which forbid racial discrimination in any 
member state. 
An ever increasing number of black Americans adopted the pan-racial and anti-
colonial stance of Du Bois in the belief that their fate would always be inte^ined with 
that of colored people everywhere. A. Philip Randolph declared his belief that "the 
interest of the Negro people in America [was] the interest of Negroes all over the 
world."^^ Walter White, Secretary of the NAACP, expressed similar sentiments when he 
noted that the plight of black Americans was "part and parcel to the problems of other 
colored peoples."^^ In the post-war years, nearly every major Negro improvement 
organization placed the fight against colonialism onto their agenda. In addition, leading 
national black newspapers, like the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier, began 
^^James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and 
the Cold War, \9A3>-\953)" African Historical Studies 4, no. 2 (1971): pp. 253-270; 
Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 152-153; and Williams, "Blacks and American Foreign 
Affairs," pp. 533-536. 
^'A. Philip Randolph, "March on Washington Movement Presents Program for the 
Negro," in Logan (ed.). What the Negro Wants, p. 152. 
^^Quoted in Roark, "American Black Leaders," p. 261. 
30 
devoting increased attention and editorial space to anti-colonial struggles occurring 
around the world. 
Coinciding with their increased awareness of international affairs, black 
Americans began increasingly to utilize crises occurring aroiind the world to highlight 
both their ovra plight and that of colored peoples everywhere. In doing so, they began to 
draw analogies of the sort they would later use so heavily in the Hungarian Crisis. When 
Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, the mainstream newspapers vowed to 
always "Remember Pearl Harbor." When an angry white mob lynched a black man in 
Sikeston, Missouri on January 25,1942, the Chicago Defender declared that American 
must "Remember Pearl Harbor...and Sikeston too!" and "Japan Lynched Pearl Harbor; 
Sikeston Lynched Democracy.""" Similar use of international events can be seen in the 
comparison George Schuyler, editor for the Pittsburgh Courier, drew between Nazism 
and imperialism: "Negro countries have been overrun...and their peoples chained and 
exploited like those of the European lands currently under Nazi rule.""' Roy Wilkins of 
the NAACP even went as far as to compare the plight of Germany's Jewish population 
^®Mary McLeod Bethime, "Certain Unalienable Rights," pp. 248-258; A. Philip 
Randolph, "March on Washington Movement Presents Program for the Negro," pp. 134-
135 & 152-153; George S. Schuyler, "The Caucasian Problem," pp. 281-89 & 294; and 
Roy Wilkins, "The Negro Wants Full Equality," pp. 113-114 (all in Logan (ed.), What the 
Negro Wants); Plummer, Rising Wind, pp. 89,125-126, 133-135 & 157, Roark, 
"American Black Leaders," pp. 253-262; and Williams, "Blacks and American Foreign 
Affairs," pp. 533-536. 
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"'Schuyler, "The Caucasian Problem," in Logan (ed.), What the Negro Wants, p. 
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with the presence of black ghettos in America: "If it was cause for international weeping 
that Jews were beaten in Berlin and scourged into a loathsome ghetto in Warsaw, what 
about a tear for black ghettos in America.'"*^ In none of these and other similar statements 
did black Americans really wish to imply that they felt no sympathy for the victims of 
such tragedies. Rather, the purpose of these statements seems to have been to draw 
attention to, and emphasize the seriousness of, the plight of black Americans.''^ 
The experience of black Americans in World War II would have repercussions far 
beyond the immediate war years. For the most part, black Americans were able to hold 
onto and build upon the economic opportunities secured in World War II. As with earlier 
periods of urbanization, the black press and improvement organizations achieved 
increased growth and influence. In 1940 the black press had a total circulation of 
approximately 1,300,000. By 1945, circulation had skyrocketed to 1,809,000. World 
War II also enabled the NAACP to broaden its influence. In 1941 it had a total 
membership of around 50,00; By 1946 it had well over 400,000 members.'" The growing 
power of the NAACP enabled it to gather increased financial support to launch a series of 
court cases which, added to the legal precedents set in the 1930s, eventually dealt the 
'•^Wilkins, "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in Logan (ed.). What the Negro 
Wants, p. 115. 
"•^See also Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 102 & 107 and Kluger, Simple Justice, 
p. 25-
Franklin Frazier argues that this tremendous growth enabled the NAACP to 
more accurately reflect the opinions and concerns of the mass of average Negroes than it 
had at any time in its previous history. 
final blow to legal segregation. The immediate post-war years also saw the return of 
thousands of highly determined black veterans who, thanks to the G.I. Bill, had the 
economic means to pursue higher education. This situation presented Jim Crow states 
with two real options. Either they could build more facilities specifically intended for 
blacks students, a very costly option, or they could desegregate existing white facilities.'" 
The coming of the Cold War had both positive and negative implications for black 
Americans' fight for equality. On one hand, the Cold War created an atmosphere where 
any demand for change was seen as potentially "communist inspired." However, the 
Cold War also provided black Americans with increased opportunities to highlight the 
incongruity between the United States' claim of moral world leadership and the pervasive 
presence of racism at home. It became very difficult for the United States to point 
accusingly towards the Soviet Union's disregard for human rights when its treatment of 
its own colored citizens remained so poor. The Soviet Union, of course, seized upon 
every opportunity to exploit the America's racial problems for its own ends. It became 
increasingly clear that the United States would have to take firm steps toward rectifying 
these problems, or risk losing the respect of the international community, especially the 
emerging Afro-Asian block. The Asian nation of Ceylon noted that racism and 
discrimination in the United States provided "the greatest propaganda gift any country 
could give the Kremlin in its persistent bid for the affections of the colored races of the 
"^Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 99-100; 
Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 535-539; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 
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world.""® Though other factors, notably the growing importance of black voters, played a 
role as well, the Cold War strongly influenced both Harry S. Truman's and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower's support of civil rights issues"^ 
The 1950s ushered in the height of the Cold War, the last gasps of imperialism, 
and the beginnings of the modem Civil Rights Movement. These three forces would 
profoundly affect one another and the way black Americans viewed their nation, the 
world, and ultimately, the Himgarian Crisis. With the advent of the Civil Rights 
Movement, and the watershed decision in Brown v. Board of Education, black Americans 
began to take an renewed and increasing interest in the racial implications of both 
America's domestic and foreign affairs. The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement in 
America also coincided with the increasingly strident demands by the colored nations of 
the Afro-Asian block to be free from colonial domination. Black Americans began 
increasingly to identify their fight against Jim Crow at home with the Afro-Asian block's 
fight against imperialism overseas. Black Americans looked on with pride as former 
colonies throughout Asia and Africa threw off the final vestiges of colonialism and 
emerged as full-fledged nations. When they saw examples of continued oppression, 
black Americans protested loudly. Though black Americans wholly supported their 
nation in the Cold War, they also pointed out that communism was not the only, or even 
the worst, evil facing the world. For black Americans, the continuance of racism at home 
"^Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 193. 
"^Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 186-196; Plummer, Rising Wind, pp. 4, 167-
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and imperialism overseas constituted a greater threat to international harmony than even 
the Cold War/^ 
By the mid-1950s, black Americans had made many gains. Urbanization, war, 
and the continued fight by organizations like the NAACP had brought them closer than 
they had ever been to social, economic, and political equality. A limited, but ever 
increasing, number of black Americans achieved prominent positions in the entertainment 
industry, sports, business, and perhaps most important, political life. The United States 
Congress now had three black Congressmen; Charles C. Diggs of Michigan, William L. 
Dawson of Illinois, and Adam Clayton Powell of New York.^' Dwight D. Eisenhower 
also appointed the first two black Americans to serve in executive positions in the 
Executive Branch; J. Ernest Wilkins served as Assistant Secretary of Labor and E. 
Frederic Morrow as Special White House Assistant. Black Americans also benefitted, 
though not nearly to the extent as did the rest of America, from the booming economy of 
the 1950s. Perhaps most important. Brown v. Board of Education had, after decades of 
legal battles, at last stripped away the legal foimdation supporting Jim Crow segregation. 
No other event imbued so many black Americans with a renewed sense of optimism for 
the ftiture as this one Supreme Court decision. 
''^Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History 
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By 1956 when the first Hungarian refugees began to arrive, equality and full 
citizenship for black Americans had became clearly visible, but still continued to remain 
just beyond their grasp. While Brown v. Board of Education had monxmiental 
consequences for the future, Jim Crow did not simply fall away in 1954. Instead, Brown 
V. Board ushered in a violent backlash, particularly in the South, against black 
Americans' pursuit of integration and equality. Their nation's failure to guarantee them 
equality and freedom from fear left many black Americans feeling frustrated and 
betrayed. Black Americans had helped build their nation in the industrial era, fought in 
two world wars, and remained loyal citizens in their nation's new Cold War. Yet still 
their nation continued to deny them basic rights and privileges entitled to all American 
citizens. The frustration of black Americans at their continued status as second-class 
citizens, despite their many contributions, played an important role in the irritated and 
often bitter reaction of black Americans to their nation's efforts to rescue Hungary's 
refugees. 
CHAPTER II: THE RESPONSE AND PARTICIPATION OF THE AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT, MEDIA, AND PUBLIC IN THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956 
AND 1957 
The roots of the Hungarian Revolt lay in part at the Twentieth Conference of the 
Soviet Union's Communist party, held in February 1956. As part of the new path toward 
"destalinization" Nikita Khrushchev spoke of embarking upon an improved relationship 
with Russia's Eastern European satellites. This relationship, he said, should be 
characterized by increased cooperation and equality.^® When the word of this 
liberalization leaked out, it stirred Russia's Eastern European satellites to demand greater 
reforms and increased freedom over their own affairs. News of successful 
demonstrations in Poland set off similar protests in Hungary, and by the Fall of 1956 
Hungary was experiencing ever increasing daily unrest.^' 
In an attempt to appease those demanding reforms, Emo Gero, First Secretary of 
the Himgarian Corrmiunist Party, invited the popular, exiled ex-premier, Imre Nagy, to 
return and share power. Even this invitation, however, failed to quiet the increasingly 
aggressive demands for reform. In Budapest on October 23, 1956 demonstrations turned 
into rioting, street fighting, and finally full scale revolt. Hungarian troops refused to fire 
®°See text of Khrushchev's speech in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), A Documentary 
History of Communism, Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 224-231. 
^'Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 
354; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 295-296; and 
Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 3-4 & 6. 
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on student protestors. Instead, they began to defect and join the rebellion against Soviet 
occupation. The fighting soon spread from Budapest into the countryside. The rebels' 
demands included the complete withdrawal of Russian occupational forces, free elections, 
abolition of the hated secret police, greater religious freedom, and the end of forced 
collectivization and industrialization.^^ 
In an effort to quiet the growing rebellion, Soviet leaders agreed to allow Nagy to 
be frilly reinstated as Premier of Hungary. Nagy then reorganized the government and 
won a promise from the Soviets to withdraw their troops. Despite that promise, however, 
Soviet troops still remained on November 1, 1956. By this time, Russian troops were 
rapidly approaching Budapest, and Nagy grew increasingly desperate. He proceeded to 
declare Hungary a neutral nation, to announce its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and 
to state his intention of turning toward the United Nations and the West for aid and 
protection. As part of these efforts, Nagy urgently requested that the United Nations 
demand that the Soviets abide by their earlier promise to withdraw their troops 
peacefully. However, Nagy's efforts failed to halt the advance of Russian troops. On 
November 4,1956 thousands of Soviet tanks and troops entered Budapest and put down 
^^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 98, 
pp. 263-264 and "Transcript of a Teletype Conversation Between the Legation in 
Hungary and the Department of State, October 25, 1956," No. 108, pp. 271-286 (both in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990)[hereafter cited as Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe}-, Dwight D- Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging 
Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 62-69; 
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 295; and Radvanyi, 
Hungary and the Superpowers, p. 7. 
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the Hungarian Revolution with a brutality that shocked the world. The government of 
Nagy fell and a Soviet backed government headed by Janos Kadar then took over. 
Thousands of Hungarian rebels died in the days of brutal street fighting that followed. As 
a result of the heavy bloodshed and fear of further Soviet reprisals, Hungarian refugees 
began pouring into neighboring Austria by the thousands. Before the crisis came to an 
end, well over one-hundred thousand refugees crossed into Austria.^^ 
The Eisenhower administration closely watched events in Himgary. They greeted 
the news of the uprising with an uneasy mix of surprise, sympathy, excitement, and fear. 
Eisenhower declared that "the heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary."^" 
The rebellion, however, also inspired a sense of excitement. After all, it appeared to be 
an ideal opportunity to validate Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' frequent rhetoric of 
"liberation of captive peoples" and a "roll back of communism." Dulles conveyed a sense 
of this sentiment when he declared: "We are on the point of winning an immense and 
^^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 254-255; United Nations, General Assembly, 
Official Records of the General Assembly Second Emergency Special Session 4-10 
November 1956, Plenary Meetings and Annex, p. 1 [UN Doc. A/3251]; United Nations, 
Security Council, Security Council Official Records, Eleventh Year, Supplement for 
October, November, and December 1956, pp. 11-120 [UN Doc. S/3726]; Ambrose, 
Eisenhower, pp. 370-371; Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 81 & 87; George and 
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 296-298; and Radvanyi, Hungary 
and the Superpowers, pp. xv, 7-8, & 12-14. 
^""Statement by the President," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 
906 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: 1956), p. 700. [hereafter cited as 
DSBl 
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long-hoped for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe.Eisenhower himself 
displayed a similar attitude: "The United States considers the developments in Hungary 
as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the 
Himgarian people."®^ At a National Security Council Meeting, held on November 1, 
1956, Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, best expressed this sense of 
excitement when he declared that "what had occiuTed...was a miracle."^' Fear of 
provoking the Soviet Union into war, however, tempered the administration's excitement. 
Though he too seemed to share the excitement of possibilities brought about by the 
revolt, Eisenhower recognized that this was also a "dangerous moment." He expressed 
concern that "with the deterioration of the Soviet Union's hold over its satellites might not 
the Soviet Union be tempted to resort to extreme measure, even to start a world war?"^® 
Eisenhower's concerns in this matter can be seen in his preparation for his October 31, 
1956 address to the American people. Rather than giving the speech already prepared for 
him by John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower completely revised Dulles' draft, considerably 
toning down its references to "irresistible forces of liberation in Eastern Europe."^' 
^'Quoted in Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 83. 
^^"Statement by the President," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 906 (November 5, 1956), p. 
700. 
^'Memorandum, "Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security 
Coimcil, November 1, 1956," p. 1, 302nd Meeting of NSC, Box 8, NSC Series, Papers of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. 
'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 67. 
''Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the 
Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 219-222 and "Developments in 
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Almost from the very start of the crisis, the administration's statements indicated that 
while America ultimately desired a free and independent Eastern Europe, they "could not, 
or course, carry out this policy by resort to force. 
The Eisenhower administration's decision to not use military force to save 
Hungary resulted from a number of factors. The Suez Crisis played an important role in 
this decision. On October 29, 1956 the joint forces of Israel, France, and Great Britain 
attacked Egypt in attempt to stop Gamal Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. 
Because of their role as America's primary allies in the Cold War, Britain and France 
naturally expected the United States to support them. In addition, many officials in the 
British government counted on the power of their longstanding personal friendships with 
Eisenhower to exert a favorable influence on his administrations's response to their 
actions in Suez. Israel, in turn, banked on the upcoming election and the power of the 
Jewish vote to gain the Eisenhower administration's support or, at least, neutrality. The 
administration, however, viewed this attack as a brutal, poorly planned, and blatantly 
obvious throwback to the tactics that had characterized nineteenth century gimboat 
diplomacy. While it troubled him to side against old friends and allies, Eisenhower 
concluded that Britain, France, and Israel had obviously acted as the aggressors. He 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), pp. 
743-745. 
^°"Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. October 31,1956," Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1958), p. 1061. [hereafter cited as Public Papers of DDE, 1956] 
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further believed that their actions constituted a clear violation of the 1950 Tri-Partite 
Declaration, and thus obligated him oppose the invasion.®' In a speech to the American 
people Eisenhov^er declared that; "We value...the bonds with those great nations, those 
great friends, with whom we now so plainly disagree...But this we know above all: there 
are...firm principles...and we shall not break ours."®^ To register his administration's 
disapproval internationally, Eisenhower sent Dulles directly to the UN with a cease fire 
resolution for the Middle East. This action made American opposition explicitly known 
to the world and, needless to say, infuriated America's allies. By diverting the United 
States' attention from Hungary, dividing the Western world, and wholly occupying 
Britain and France, Suez effectively eliminated any possibility of united Western military 
action on behalf of Himgary.®^ 
The Suez Crisis also served to diminish the adverse impact that Soviet aggression 
®'This declaration, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
in 1950 promised to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. In it these three nations 
agreed to ensure that arms shipments to Arabs and Israelis remained balanced, and kept at 
a minimum. They also agreed to initiate joint action against the aggressor should the 
peace between Egypt and Israel ever be violated. 
Address in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. November 1 1956," 
Public Papers of DDE, 1956,-p. 1072 
^^Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 378-393 & 430-431; Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), pp. 98-91; "Address 
in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. November 1 1956," Public Papers of 
DDE, 1956, p. 1072; Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 350-366; Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 
255-270; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 298 & 304; 
Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 64-89; and Radvanyi, Hungary and the 
Superpowers, pp. 10-11. 
had on world opinion. This element can particularly be seen with regards to the reaction 
of the nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The Eisenhower administration 
repeatedly sought to enlist the aid of the Afro-Asian block in America's efforts to 
mobilize world opinion against the Soviets. For these nations, however, the situation in 
Hungary, while perhaps unfortunate, paled in comparative importance to British, French, 
and Israeli aggression against Egypt. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, pointed 
out that Nasser's defiance of Western imperialism "has powerfully moved the countries of 
Asia and Africa."^ Eisenhower, however, regarded Nehru's concern for oppressed 
peoples as too narrowly focused. He suggested that "Nehru thinks of only one thing, 
which is colonialism, by which he [Nehru] means the white over colored people."®' 
Eisenhower and his administration did recognize that, for many of the nations of the 
developing world, the action taken by Britain, France, and Israel dredged up impleasant 
memories of past imperialism. The administration, however, sought to convince Nehru 
and others like him that the Soviets practiced "a type of colonialism that was far more 
serious and cruel than that practiced in the past by some of the Western nations - the latter 
a dying practice."®^ As a whole, the nations of Africa and the Near and Middle East, 
while appreciating America's strong stance on the Suez Crisis, remained largely 
^''Quoted in Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 108. 
^'"Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, 
November 5, 1956, 10:20 a.m.," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 168, p. 
394. 
^^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 112. 
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unconvinced that their interests lay with active opposition to the Soviets on the Hungarian 
issue. 
In light of his administration's general failure to gain more active support from the 
Afro-Asian block in the Hungarian Crisis, Eisenhower expressed his frustration that these 
nations were "not far more alarmed by the forceful domination of Eastern Europe by 
Russia than...the few vestiges of Western colonialism."®^ The administration also, at 
times, discussed whether the nations of the Near and Middle East may have made a deal 
with the Soviets in order to gain stronger support on the Suez issue.®^ The nations of the 
East understandably, however, viewed the international situation in light of their interests 
and from their own xmique historical experience. Many of these nations had only recently 
gained their independence and emerged from a long and unhappy experience with 
Western imperialism. As a result, their sympathies were with Egypt, and their fears of 
Western colonialism remained paramount. The Eisenhower administration readily came 
to conviction that the imtimely nature of Suez had cost the West a priceless moral and 
"Ibid. 
®*This alleged "deal" refers to the choice of many Asian nations to abstain from 
voting on UN resolutions which condenmed the Soviet Union and called for immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Himgary. When the United Nation's General Assembly 
approved America's resolution of November 4, 1957, the Asian nations of Ceylon, India, 
Burma, and Indonesia attempted to present amendments which moderated the 
condemnatory nature of this resolution. When this attempt failed, these nations 
introduced their own resolution. This resolution, while far more moderate than that of the 
United States, did agree on some basic measures. One of the most significant areas of 
agreement was Asia's inclusion of a call for the presence of United Nations observers in 
Hungary. (See United Nations documents: A/3286, A/3319, A/3325, and A/3437). 
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public relations victory in the Cold War,®' At a National Security Council meeting of 
November 8, 1956 the participants pointed to this lost opportunity: "If the British and 
French had stayed out of Egypt...they [the Soviets] would have been ruined in the eyes of 
world public opinion."^" 
There still remained the possibility that the United States could act alone in 
providing conventional military support or an air lift of supplies to the Hungarian rebels. 
However, geography argued against this option. The only way to reach Himgary was 
through or over surrounding communist nations or neutral Austria. To cross into 
communist nations meant facing the almost certain possibility of war. To cross into or 
over Austria meant violating neutrality laws and placing Austria at risk of physical 
^'Telegram #1176, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru, November 5, 
1956 and Telegram #1242, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru, November 11, 
1956 (both in India's Prime Minister Nehru 1956 (2), Box 29, International Series, Papers 
of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; 
"Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, 
November 5,1956,10:20 a.m.," No. 168, pp. 394-395, "Telegram from the Department 
of State to the Mission at the United Nations," No. 172, pp. 404-405; "Memorandum of 
Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
November 8, 1956, 9-11:25 a.m.," No. 175, pp. 419-420; "Editorial Note," No. 180, p. 
428; "Notes on the 46th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related 
Problems, Washington, November 13, 1956," No. 185, pp. 439-440; "Editorial Note," 
No. 193, pp. 460-462; and "Notes on the 56th Meeting of the Special Committee on 
Soviet and Related Problems, December 11, 1956," No. 207, p. 503 (all in Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 107-108 & 
112; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 431. 
'""Memorandum of Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security 
Council," Washington, November 8, 1956, 9-11:25 a.m." Foreign Relations, Eastern 
Europe, Vol. 25, No. 175, pp. 419-420. 
45 
destruction if conflict should erupt^' Therefore, as Eisenhower concluded, Hungary 
remained "as inaccessible to us as Tibet."^^ 
The United States' vast arsenal of nuclear weapons provided the Eisenhower 
administration with another possible option. Nuclear threats had worked in ending the 
Korean War; America still maintained a clear nuclear superiority; and the Russians well 
knew of this superiority. However, the fear of a world wdde nuclear war and 
Eisenhower's fervent belief that the Soviets would not back down precluded this option. 
Eisenhower recognized that the Soviets had much more at stake than the United States on 
the Himgarian issue. Eisenhower surmised that the survival of the Soviet Union 
depended upon their meiintaining dominance over Eastern Europe. Based on this belief, 
Eisenhower concluded that the Soviets would do anything, even use nuclear weapons, to 
protect their hegemony in Eastern Europe. He believed that the Soviets would perceive 
any American conventional military operations or nuclear threats on behalf of Hungary as 
a deliberate attempt to secure allies in Eastern Europe and destroy the Warsaw Pact." As 
^'Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 355 & 367; Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 88-
89 & 95; George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 303-304; 
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 430; and Richardson, Presidency of Eisenhower, 
pp. 99. 
'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 95. 
'^Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States 
Foreign Policy From Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 
pp. 111-114; Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster 
Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), 
180-181; "The Task of Waging Peace," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 906 (November 5, 1956), p. 
697; "Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, p. 744 and "The Hungarian 
Question in the Security Council," p. 758 (both in DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907, November 12, 
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a result, the Eisenhower administration took every occasion "to remove any false fears 
that we...look upon...Eastern European countries as potential military allies."^'' In their 
final assessment, the Eisenhower administration concluded that any intervention "would 
risk a nuclear war with the Russians, and the American government was not prepared to 
take this risk on the Hungarian issue. 
While the decision to not risk war over the Hungarian Crisis was probably a wise 
decision, the question of American complicity in fostering the rebellion and then 
abandoning its fighters dogged the Eisenhower administration. Critics pointed to the 
activities and pronouncements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Voice of 
America, and in particular, Radio Free Europe. The Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European satellites, not surprisingly, focused on America's alleged initial actions in 
instigating the rebellion. These governments accused the United States of maliciously 
interfering in the domestic affairs of Hungary. They asserted that for years the American 
1956); "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. October 31,1956," p. 1062 and "Address in 
Convention Hall, Philadelphia Pennsylvania. November 1, 1956," p. 1071 (both in Public 
Papers of DDE, 1956); Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 367; Eisenhower, White House Years, 
pp. 67-68; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 304-306; 
Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers, 11-12; and Richardson, Presidency of 
Eisenhower, pp. 99-100 and 71. 
'''"Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 
(November 12, 1956), p. 744. 
'^Quoted in Brown, Faces of Power, p. 113. 
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Congress had appropriated funds for the express purpose of fomenting rebellion.^® The 
Soviet block further maintained that the United States, not the Soviet Union, bore sole 
responsibility for the disorder and bloodshed in Himgary. The Soviet block also argued 
that the United States still continued to employ its "low and criminal propaganda 
designed to obstruct the restoration of normal life in Hungary at all costs."^^ 
While the Soviet Union's condemnation of the United States could be dismissed 
as deceptive rhetoric designed to detract world opinion from their own brutal aggression, 
other international sources also criticized America's role in the Hungarian Crisis. The 
United Nations, Austrians, Germans, and the Hvmgarian rebels themselves all expressed 
their conviction that the United States bore some responsibility for the tragedy occurring 
in Hungary. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, which always focused on the Eisenhower 
administration's actions and their role in instigating the rebellion, these voices of reproach 
focused their criticism on the Eisenhower administration's inaction after the rebellion had 
begim. They were not upset so much with America's alleged encouragement of rebellion, 
as with its later failure to intervene more assertively on behalf of Hungary's freedom 
fighters. International critics saw America's failure to provide more material assistance as 
^^These charges refer to the 1951 Kersten Amendment to the National Security 
Act. This amendment allowed the United States Congress to appropriate fimds for what 
the Soviets referred to as "espionage and diversionist activity." These activities included 
the recruiting and training of dissident groups throughout Eastern Europe as well as 
propaganda efforts like Voice of American and Radio Free Europe. 
^^See United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records of the General 
Assembly Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol 2., Verbatim Records of Meetings 12 
November 1956-8 March 1957, pp. 693-697 [UN Doc. A/PV.620]. 
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an outright abandonment of the promises implied in both the Eisenhower administration's 
repeated declarations of "liberation" and its propaganda activities in Eastern Europe.'^ 
In response to their perception that America had somehow failed Hungary, these 
critics expressed emotions ranging from disgust, to bitterness, to disillusionment. Henry 
Cabot Lodge, American representative to the United Nations, repeatedly expressed 
concern over the feeling among some members of the UN that the United States had 
"been exciting the Hvmgarians...and now that they are in trouble, we turn our backs on 
them."'® Austria, which by virtue of geography, bore the brunt of caring for the refugees, 
also complained to American diplomats that the United States had "incited the 
Himgarians to action" and then failed to "do anything effective."*" Among the rebels 
themselves there were who charged that "the US for the attainment of its own selfish 
''^"Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State," No. 129, p. 
319; "Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the President, November 9,1956," 
No. 178, pp. 424-425, "Notes on the 46th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet 
and Related Problems, Washington, November 13,1956," No. 185, pp. 436-438; 
"Editorial Note," No. 180, p. 460; "Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the 
Department of State," No. 198, pp. 472-473; "Telegram From the Department of State to 
the Embassy in Austria," No. 202, pp. 481-482; "Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the 
Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, November 30,1956," 
No. 204, pp. 494-495, and "Editorial Note," No. 228, pp. 556-558 (all in Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 371-372; George & 
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 300; and Richardson, Presidency of 
Eisenhower, p. 99 
^'"Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the President, November 9, 
1956, Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 178, p. 424 
®°"Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State," Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 129, p. 319. 
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goals, had cynically and cold-bloodedly maneuvered the Hungarian people into action"^' 
However, according to the American Legation, most Hungarians felt disappointed rather 
than bitter, and generally expressed their belief that "since we [the United States] were 
fostering liberty we would help the revolt."®^ 
Domestic opinion, as measured through statements of American diplomats, press, 
and Congressmen conveyed a sense of embarrassment and recognition that international 
criticism held some validity. Members of the American Legation in Budapest, who 
witnessed the situation first-hand, repeatedly communicated back to the State Department 
regarding what they saw as inappropriate conduct on the part of Radio Free Europe. 
Though the Legation never pinpointed specific broadcasts or statements, or actually 
accused the Eisenhower administration of intentionally fomenting revolution, the 
Legation repeatedly stated their belief that Radio Free Europe did, even if inadvertently, 
give the wrong impression to the rebels. The Legation argued that in light of the events 
in Himgary, the United States needed to reassess how other nations might interpret its 
propaganda.®^ Members of the American Legation pointed out that "our past radio 
^'"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 198, p. 472. 
®^"Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related 
Problems, Washington, November 30,1956," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 
25, No. 204, p. 495. 
®^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 198, 
pp. 472-73; "Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related 
Problems, Washington, November 30, 1956," No. 204, pp. 494-495; and "Despatch From 
the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 214, pp. 520-522 (all in 
Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe Vol. 25). 
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propaganda is at present [a] source of much embarrassment to us."^"* 
The American Congress and press, while not having the same intimate knowledge 
of the situation as the Legation, expressed similar criticism of what they perceived to be 
their government's abandonment of promises, implied or otherwise, to help the 
Hungarians. On March 13, 1957 reporters questioned Dulles as to why his administration 
"did not give military aid to Hungary when she appealed to the United States to protect 
her from Russia."®' In his memoirs Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, 
reported on having to deal with a "stream of anxious visitors" some of whom were 
"accusing the State Department of having actively fomented the Hungarian Rebellion."^® 
While most domestic criticism may not have gone this far, there was a clear sense in the 
American Congress and media that the United States bore some responsibility for the 
tragic turn of events in Hungary.®' For example, John O' Kearney of The Nation argued 
*^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," Foreign 
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 198, p. 472. 
^'"Secretary Dulles' News Conference Canberra, March 13," DSB, Vol 36, No. 
927 (April 1, 1957), p. 533. 
®®Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 429. 
^^Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, First 
Session, Vol. 103, Parts 1-12 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 
325-326, 750-751 & 771-772 & 9763-9764 [hereafter cited as Congressional Record]-, 
Congressional Record Appendix, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, First 
Session, pp. A287-A288 & A482-A483, A4524 & A5136 [hereafter cited as 
Congressional Record Appendix]-, Mark Gayn, "10 Days That Shook the World: The 
Counter-Revolution," The Nation, 10 November 1956, pp. 379-382; John O' Kearney, 
"Hungary: Myth and Reality," The Nation, 2 February 1957, pp. 91-94; Walter Ridder, 
"Our Propaganda in Hungary," The Ne-w Republic, 17 December 1956, pp. 12-13; "Day 
of Atonement," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 2; Edmond Taylor, "The Lessons of 
Hungary," The Reporter, 27 December 1957, pp. 17-21; "Five Free Days," Time, 10 
that, while Radio Free Europe may not have actually incited the revolt, it "played a large 
part in keeping blood flowing.Senator Richard L. Neuberger, a Democrat from 
Oregon, similarly argued that "our phrasemakers must assume a share of the 
responsibility for the terrible bloodshed and tragedies."^' 
The Eisenhower administration always maintained that the rebellion was a 
"spontaneous uprising," and that America played little or no role in its instigation. With 
regards to the official government activities of Voice of America and the CIA, 
Eisenhower asserted that, while of course America wanted to see freedom come to 
Eastern Europe, "the United States doesn't now, and never has advocated open rebellion 
by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail. 
With regards to the unofficial activities of Radio Free Europe, the Eisenhower 
administration argued that the administration only provided guidelines and could not be 
held responsible the content of all broadcasts. However, they also stated that they 
believed that, while Radio Free Europe may have slightly exceeded its boimdaries, it 
generally remained within the established guidelines. The Eisenhower administration 
consistently maintained that the Hungarians acted of their own accord, and that America 
December 1956, p. 6; and "Himgary: Doing it Themselves," Time, 17 December 1956, p. 
26. 
Kearney, "Hungary: Myth and Reality," p. 4 
^'^Congressional Record, p. 771. 
'°"The President's News Conference of November 14, 1956," Public Papers of 
DDE, 1956,^. 1096. 
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could, at the very most, be found guilty only of keeping alive the idea of freedom." 
The message that freedom exists and what it 
means has been carried in broadcasts from 
the free world to captive peoples, who 
otherwise would hear only what their police 
state masters want them to hear. The very 
fact that freedom exists anywhere will, of 
course, encourage those who are deprived of 
it to strive for their own liberty and 
independence.'^ 
Whether or not they played a part in instigating the rebellion, the Eisenhower 
administration had to deal with the Hungarian Crisis in light of the hard realities of a 
tense international situation, an inaccessible geographic location, and the Soviet's high 
motivation to preserve their empire. In the final assessment, the use of force brought with 
it too many risks. Faced with such risks, the United States had few options to halt the 
bloodshed. The only remaining possibilities lay with verbal condemnation and providing 
aid and comfort to the Hungarian victims of Soviet aggression. Eisenhower recalled in 
his memoirs that "the United States did the only thing it could... readied [itself]...to help 
""Secretary Dulles' News Conference Canberra, March 13," DSB, Vol. 36, No. 
927 (April 1,1957), p. 533; "Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the 
President, November 9, 1956," No. 178, pp. 424-425; "Editorial Note," No. 193, p. 460; 
"Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency 
(Washburn) to the President," No. 197, pp. 470-471; "Memorandum From the Director of 
Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the President," No. 199, pp. 473-475; and "Memorandum 
From the Acting Secretary of State to the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)," No. 213, 
pp. 518-519 (all in Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); "The President's News 
Conference of November 14,1956," Public Papers of DDE 1956, p. 1096; Ambrose, 
Eisenhower, 371-372; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 429. 
'^"Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President's Press 
Secretary (Hagerty)," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 213, p. 519. 
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the refugees fleeing from the...Soviets, and did everything possible to condemn the 
aggression.'"^ 
The administration's earliest efforts came through the United Nations and 
personal diplomacy. On November 3, 1956 Henry Cabot Lodge, American ambassador 
to the UN, introduced a resolution calling on the Soviets "to desist...from any form of 
intervention, particularly armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary."^'' 
However, the Soviets, quite predictably, vetoed this resolution on November 4, 1956. At 
this point, the United Nations, again at the urging of Lodge, decided that the situation 
warranted calling an emergency session of the General Assembly. At this emergency 
session. Lodge introduced another resolution calling on the Soviets to end their military 
intervention. This resolution further called upon the Soviet Union to permit the entry of 
UN observers and humanitarian supplies into Hungary. This resolution passed by a vote 
of 53-9 with 13 abstentions. However, with the exception of allowing some food and 
medical supplies to enter Hungary, the Soviets simply ignored this and other similar 
resolutions.®^ 
While Lodge worked in the UN to bring world attention to the plight of Hungary, 
'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 89. 
'^"Text of U.S. Draft Resolution Vetoed By U.S.S.R on November 4," DSB, Vol. 
35, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), p. 763. 
'^"The Hungarian Question in the Security Council," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 
(November 12, 1956), pp. 757-763; "The Hungarian Question Before the General 
Assembly," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 908 (November 19, 1956), pp. 800-807; Eisenhower, 
White House Years, p. 89; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 431. 
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Eisenhower attempted to influence the Soviet Union through personal diplomacy. On 
November 4, 1956 Eisenhower wrote to Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet 
Council of Ministers. In this letter, Eisenhower reminded Bulganin of the "Declaration of 
the Soviet Government of October 30, 1956." In this declaration, the Soviets argued that 
their policy had always been one of "respect of territorial integrity, state independence 
and sovereignty, and noninterference in...another's domestic affairs." This declaration 
went on to admit that "the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary [could] serve 
as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation."'^ Eisenhower then pointed out 
that this declaration "was generally understood as promising the early withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Hungary.The Soviets, however, coldly informed Eisenhower that 
the situation in Hungary did not concern him, and that the "problem of the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Himgary...[came] completely and entirely under the competence of the 
Himgarian and Soviet governments."'® 
Faced with a situation in which moral suasion had failed miserably and the use of 
force posed unacceptable risks, the Eisenhower administration could do little more than 
offer America's tremendous resources to aid the thousands of Hungarian refugees fleeing 
'^"Text of Soviet Statement of October 30," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 (November 
12, 1956), pp. 745-746. 
'^"Message to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R., 
Urging Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Hungary. November 5, 1956," Public Papers 
of DDE. 795(5, p. 1080. 
'^"Message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R 
(Bulganin) to the President, November 7, 1956," in Paul E. Zinner (ed.). Documents of 
American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 260. 
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into neighboring Austria. On November 8, 1956 the Eisenhower administration set in 
motion the necessary mechanisms for the emergency processing of 5,000 Hungarian visa 
applications under the Refugee Relief Act. Within two weeks, the Defense Department 
had transported the first group of refugees to the United States.®' Upon their arrival, 
Eisenhower himself welcomed them to America and expressed his administration's 
commitment to continue to provide assistance: "I want to tell you that our covmtry feels 
privileged in inviting you to the United States...We shall continue our efforts to...help 
those who are coming..and...be very, very glad to do so."'°° 
By the end of November, the Eisenhower administration would be faced with the 
opportunity to make good on its promise to help the refugees. It soon became clear that 
America's initial offer of asylum would not sufficiently reduce the massive numbers of 
refugees fleeing daily into Austria. The administration then took further steps to alleviate 
the crisis. On December 1, 1956 it announced that the U.S. would accept an additional 
15,000 refiigees imder the parolee provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Under the parolee provision, refugees could be admitted only on a temporary basis. 
However, Eisenhower promised that in January he would go to Congress and seek 
^'Memorandum, Max Rabb to Governor Adams, November 8, 1956; 
Memorandum, Harry B. Lyford to James Hagerty, November 19, 1956; and "Remarks By 
the President to a Group of Hungarian Refugees in His Office at 9:00 A.M. November 26, 
1956," (all in Official File 154-N-2, Box 823, Papers as Dwight D. Eisenhower as 
President, White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library); "Need for Nationwide Effort 
to Admit Hungarian Refugees," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 908 (November 19, 1956), pp. 807-
808; and Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 257-258. 
'"""Remarks By the President to a Group of Hungarian Refugees in His Office at 
9:00 A.M. November 26, 1956." 
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legislation to change the refugees' status to permanent residents. He further announced 
that when these numbers had been exhausted he would continue to reassess the situation 
and find new ways to meet the need."" These actions, he maintained, would "give 
practical effect to the American people's intense desire to help the victims of Soviet 
oppression.'""^ 
The Hungarian refugee relief effort continued to pick up speed as 1956 drew to a 
close. On December 12,1956 Eisenhower sent his Vice-President, Richard Nixon, to 
Austria. He also appointed Tracy Voorhees to head the "President's Committee for 
Hungarian Relief." This committee served to provide coordination and support for the 
various volunteer and govenmient agencies involved in refugee relief work. It also 
served as a clearing house for the tremendous flow of public offers of employment, 
housing, and education that poured in daily to the government's refugee relocation center 
at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. When Nixon returned from Austria, he submitted his 
"Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees." In this report, Nixon urged the 
President to be open and flexible when it came to Hungarian inmiigration. On the basis 
'°'U.S. Department of State to Embassy in Vienna, November 28,1956, Official 
File 154-N-3, Box 824, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, White House 
Central Files, Eisenhower Library; "More Himgarian Refugees Offered Asylum in U.S.," 
DSB, Vol. 35, No. 911 (December 10,1956), p. 913; "White House Statement 
Concerning the Admission of Additional Hungarian Refugees. December 1, 1956," 
Public Papers of DDE, 1956, pp. 1116-1118; Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 257-258, 
Ambrose, p. 371; Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 97-98; and Murphy, Diplomat 
Among Warriors, p. 431. 
io2"White House Statement Concerning the Admission of Additional Hungarian 
Refugees. December 1, 1956," Public Papers of DDE, 1956, p. 1118. 
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of this recommendation, Eisenhower went to Congress and requested that revisions be 
made to the Iirmiigration and NationaUty Act to allow for the entry of an increased 
number of refiigees. He also made good on his earlier promise to request that Congress 
change the status of the Hungarian refugees from "parolees" to permanent residents. By 
the end of the 1957, over 32,000 Hungarians had been successfully resettled in the United 
States.'"^ 
Throughout the Hxmgarian Revolt and the ensuing refugee relief program, the 
majority of American opinion was characterized by enormous sympathy for the 
Hungarians and an intense desire to help in any way possible.'"^ Soviet brutality in 
putting down the Revolt shocked and horrified most Americans. For many Americans, 
this initial response would be followed by impatience with what they perceived as their 
government's failure to take more forcefial steps to halt Soviet aggression. Most 
domestic critics recognized that a legitimate fear of war motivated the Eisenhower 
administration's cautious approach. However, these same critics also believed that 
'"^"Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees," and Letter, Gerald Morgan to 
Tracy S. Voorhees, January 28,1957 (both in Official File 154-N-2, Box 823, White 
House Central Files, Eisenhower Library); "Developments Relating to Hungarian Relief 
Activities," DSB, Vol. 35, Nos. 913-914 (December 24 and 31, 1956), pp. 979-980; and 
"Recommended Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act," DSB, Vol. 36, No. 921 
(February 18, 1957), pp. 247-250. 
'"•'There were, however, a minority of individuals and groups who opposed the 
admission of the Hungarian refugees. The grounds upon which they voiced their 
opposition encompassed diverse concems. Some felt that the refugees would have an 
adverse effect on the economy. Some Protestants felt that there were too many refugees 
of both the Catholic and Jewish faiths. Other voices expressed concern that there might 
be communist infiltrators and spies among the incoming refugees. 
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American had missed an important and historical opportunity to implement liberation and 
turn the tide toward victory in the Cold War. A House Subcommittee referred to the 
Hungarian uprising as "the lost opportunity of our generation.'""^ A November 1956 
editorial in The Reporter, sent in by a reader from New Jersey, argued that peace at any 
price did not always provide the best policy option. This editorial went on to declare that 
the United States needed to "decide between freedom and slavery.'""® Similar criticism 
appeared in an editorial found in the Saturday Evening Post on January 1957. In 
discussing the risk of war as a consideration, this editorial accused America of putting 
"its fears before its principles.'""^ These and other voices throughout the Congress and 
press argued that, despite the risk or war, morality and world opinion necessitated that the 
Eisenhower administration take additional steps above and beyond UN resolutions, 
condemnatory statements, and refrigee relief'"* 
A surprising number of American critics advocated the immediate deployment of 
the United States' military forces. Others argued that, if open military intervention 
Congressional Record, p. 14637. 
io6«a Troubled Conscience," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 5. 
'"'"Let's Not Help Any Red Despot Get Off the Hook!" Saturday Evening Post, 
26 January 1957, p. 10. 
^^^Congressional Record Appendix, pp. A287-A288 & A794-A796; 
Congressional Record, pp. 51-52, 308-320, 3861-3862, 5182-5183; & 14637-14638; 
Max Ascoli, "The Price of Peacemongering," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 10; 
"Hungary: The Five Days of Freedom," Time, 12 November 1956, pp. 40-48; "Revolt in 
Hungary," Time, 26 November 1956, p. 8; "A Troubled Conscience," pp. 5-6, "Hungary: 
Doing it Themselves, p. 26; "Let's Not Help Any Red Despot Get Off the Hook!" p. 10; 
and Taylor, "The Lessons of Hungary," pp. 17-21. 
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remained unfeasible, then the Eisenhower administration should perhaps consider 
providing some form of covert military assistance to Hungary's freedom fighters. When 
it became clear that the United States government had no intention of providing any 
military support, a number of private organizations and individuals sought to raise a 
volunteer army, composed of American citizens, to aid Hungary's rebellion. Most 
Americans, however, while not entirely ruling out the use of force, instead, proposed 
varying combinations of tough economic sanctions, withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition, and the immediate expulsion of the Soviet Union and the Kadar government 
from the United Nations. Whatever particular solution they advocated, domestic critics 
all expressed a sense of anger or, at the least, disappointment, that their government had 
been either unable, or unwilling, to save Hungary.'"' This sense of disillusionment can be 
seen in an editorial in the Saturday Evening Post of February 1957. This editorial, 
written by a private citizen from Ohio, argued that from here forward the Himgarian 
Revolution would "stand as a monument to the eternal shame of those evasive 
elements..who would not, or said they could not, come to the aid of a sacrificing 
populace.""" 
''''^Congressional Record, pp. 307-320, 325-326, 316, 318-319, 325-326; 750-751, 
771-772, 2096, 3655, 3861-3862, 5182-5183,10108-10110 & 14637-14640; Christopher 
Emmet (Chairman of the Friends of Captive Nations), "Action to Save Hungary," 
America, 17 November 1956, p. 185; "Still Time to Help Hungary," Life, 24 June 1957, 
p. 36; Harold H. Martin, "The Man Who Wanted To Help Hungary," Saturday Evening 
Post, 29 December 1956, pp. 19 & 53; "Hungary's Revolt," Saturday Evening Post, 16 
February 1957, p. 5, and "Volunteers," Time, 31 December 1956, p. 2. 
"""Hungary's Revolt," p. 5. 
The Eisenhower administration's announcement of its Hungarian Refugee Relief 
Program provided a partial outlet for Americans' frustrated desire to actively aid the 
Hungarian victims of Soviet aggression. By the end of 1956, refugee relief efforts, both 
official and unofficial, had sprung up around the nation. Churches and charity 
organizations began massive fund raising drives; Colleges and universities set up 
scholarship programs; businesses rushed to provide employment; and the media began 
presenting highly dramatized and sympathetic portrayals of the Hungarians' plight.'" 
The American public's strong display of support for the Hungarian refugees can further 
be seen in the generous outpouring of food, clothing, shelter, and cash donations that 
arrived daily at Camp Kilmer. The Eisenhower administration clearly recognized the link 
between the public's earlier criticism and the overwhelmingly positive response toward 
refugee relief efforts. Discussion at a meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and 
Related Problems, held on December 19, 1956, noted that; "The realization of our 
impotence to act in Hungary had a sobering effect on public opinion." Those at this 
meeting went on to acknowledge "that the refugee matter was more and more becoming 
an American operation as a result of public criticism that too little was being done.""^ 
"'The highly sympathetic response of the mainstream media can be seen in 
Time's selection of the anonymous "Hungarian Freedom Fighter" as its 1957 "Man of the 
Year." Prior to this selection, a number of Time readers wrote in with various 
suggestions such as: "Hungarians..who have defied Soviet tyranny." (19 November 1956, 
p. 8); "Imre Nagy;" and "The unknown Hungarian youth...who showed us that a freedom-
loving heart is mightier than a tank" (both in 3 December 1956, p. 4). 
"^"Notes of the 58th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related 
Problems, Washington, December, 19, 1956," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 
25, No. 216, p. 533. 
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The extraordinary popularity of the refugee relief effort, combined with the 
widespread feeling that more should have been done, made ending the Hungarian 
Refugee Relief Program very difficult. In the Spring of 1957, the Eisenhower 
administration annoimced that the time had come to taper off refugee admissions and aid. 
This announcement set off a new wave of public criticism. The Washington Post referred 
to the administration's new policy as "cruel and capricious.""^ America, referring to the 
Eisenhower administration's earlier decision to not use force, declared that now this new 
policy could not be explained away by "pleading the risk of war or the exigencies of 
international politics.""" Critics in both Congress and the press accused the Eisenhower 
administration of once again abandoning Himgary."^ In a special article to the New York 
Times, Senator John MacCormac of Massachusetts argued that the decision to phase out 
refugee relief, combined with earlier misleading propaganda, left the Htmgarians with a 
bitter feeling that "they are being let down again.""^ MacCormac and other critics 
pointed to the some 40,000 refugees still in Austria and argued that more needed to be 
done. Critics argued that still divided families, the continued burden on Austria, and the 
need to restore and maintain respect in the eyes of the world demanded that America not 
leave its good work vmfmished. Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey expressed the 
^^^Washington Post, 8 April 1957, p. 5. 
"""Liberty in Mourning," y4mencat, 27 April 1957, pp. 10-11. 
"^It should, however, that some of the critics in the press placed equal blame on 
the United States Congress for America's failure to adequately address the refugee issue. 
York Times, 19 April 1957, p. 8. [hereafter cited as NYT\ 
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feelings of many Americans that their nation had stopped just short of fulfilling its 
obligation to the Hungarians."^ 
This is a matter not only of fairness...but 
also a matter of the appearance this country 
gives, depending upon whether or not it 
fulfills its moral obligations...in this regard. 
It is very important that we not stop now, 
before the job is done."® 
The Hungarian Revolt touched the vast majority of Americans like few other 
events in history. Rather than urging their government to concentrate on domestic affairs 
and stay out of a potentially threatening situation overseas, as is so often the case, many 
Americans pressed for greater involvement than their government was either willing or 
able to provide. The Eisenhower administration, imdoubtedly, felt sympathy for the 
Himgarian rebels and wanted to assist in their struggle to liberate themselves from Soviet 
domination. However, the threat of all-out war in a nuclear age could not be ignored. 
For the Eisenhower administration, the fear of war precluded any military assistance. 
The administration, instead, sought to use the United Nations and personal diplomacy to 
persuade the Soviet Union to halt its aggressive action. Unable to satisfy the domestic 
pressures for stronger American action, the administration took the imprecedented step of 
inviting and transporting thousands of Hungarians to America's shores. However, for 
' ^^Congressional Record Appendix, pp. A5480-A5481; Congressional Record pp. 
5223-5224; 6114-6117, 9763-9765; 10302 & 10520; Hungary - Lest We Forget!" Life, 29 
April 1957, p. 42; New York Post, 1 April 1957, p. 4; NYT, 6 April 1957, p. 1 & 6, April 
7, 1957, p. 1 & 30, April 11, 1957, p. 12, and April 19, 1957, p. 8; and Washington Post, 
8 April 1957, p. 5-
^^^CongressionalRecord, p. 6115. 
many Americans, even this action did not fully satisfy what they saw as America's 
obligation to the people of Hungary. Many individuals and groups in the American 
Congress, the media, and the general public argued that until every Hungarian refugee 
had been rescued and suitably placed, America had not ftilfilled its responsibility for the 
Hungarian Crisis. 
CHAPTER III: THE REACTION OF BLACK AMERICANS TO THE 
HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956 AND 1957 
While Eisenhower Administration sought to provide what relief it could and most 
Americans either encouraged these efforts or demanded that more be done for the 
Hungarians, black Americans viewed the Hungarian crisis from a very different 
perspective. Like most Americans, black Americans recognized that the Soviet Union 
had acted with immense brutality and total lack of concern for human rights. Black 
Americans, however, also pointed out that Hungary was not the first or only example of a 
larger, more powerful nation seeking to control and exploit a weaker power. At the same 
time America poured forth its sympathy for Hungary, black Americans called attention to 
both past and contemporary examples of aggression against the peoples of Asia and 
Africa, and these peoples' struggles to gain their freedom. Black Americans also pointed 
to their own fight for equality, and the indifference and violent resistance it so often 
encountered. Rightly or wrongly, many black Americans concluded that their nation 
simply did not care imless the victims of oppression happened to be white. James L. 
Hicks of the Amsterdam News observed that: 
We Americans...sit back and watch black 
[emphasis added] people from Ethiopia to 
Mississippi get their brains beat out by 
anyone who has guns to do the job without 
getting 'charitable' or excited. But the 
minute someone starts kicking a white 
nation around we rush to their aid by land, 
sea and air.""^ 
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17. 
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Because of its closeness in time and its interconnectedness with the situation in 
Hungary, the Suez Crisis provided black Americans with an area of ready comparisons. 
In many respects, the reaction of black Americans to the joint concurrence of the Suez 
and Hungarian Crisis more closely resembled that of the Afro-Asian block than that of 
their fellow Americans. Black opinion, unlike mainstream opinion, tended morally to 
equate the actions of Britain, France, and Israel with those of the Soviet Union. Black 
Americans argued that the Suez Crisis, like Hungary, involved a clear case of unjustified 
aggression on the part of a larger power(s) and a courageous defense put up by a smaller 
nation. Like the Afro-Asian block, many black Americans found themselves "affected by 
the plight of Egypt and stimulated by the dramatic and exciting maneuvers of Nasser."'^*' 
There are numerous examples of black Americans praising the actions of Nasser. One of 
the best examples came from Samuel Hoskins, editor of the Washington Afro-American. 
Hoskins even went so far as to compare Nasser to Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoskins 
asserted that: "Colonel Nasser, like the Rev. Martin Luther King...are...rallying points for 
millions."'^' James L. Hicks expressed a slightly different, though still sympathetic, 
perspective: "I don't give a hoot how bad he [Nasser] is, it did not justify England, 
France, or Israel...crossing his sovereign borders and shooting down men, women, and 
children.'"^^ 
^^°Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 10. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 12. 
^^-Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17. 
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Black Americans did generally recognize and appreciate the Eisenhower 
administrations' very public condemnation of Britain, France, and Israel. Black 
Americans, however, maintained that nowhere in the immense media coverage 
surrounding both crises could there be found any sympathy, or even real mention, of the 
internal suffering in Egypt. Black critics of American policy argued that Britain, France, 
and Israel's attack on Egypt, like the Soviet's attack on Himgary, had left many starving 
and homeless refugees. They demanded to know why only the Hungarians deserved 
America's offers of aid and refiige.'^^ A reader of the Philadelphia Afro-American 
pointed out that: "White America is doing all it can for the Hungarian refugees, but 
nothing for Egypt." This reader went on to suggest that "colored Americans...organize 
and send money...to help...the destitute people of Egypt.'"^" A December 1956 editorial 
sent in to the Amsterdam News expressed similar sentiments when it demanded that 
America explain its respective attitudes toward Hungary and Suez: 
What is this! Why all this all-out aid for the 
Hungarians because the Russians attacked 
them...Even special legislation to permit 
thousands more into the coimtry...What of 
the Egyptian blacks [emphasis added] who 
^^^Ibid; Associated Negro Press, 12 December 1956, Features, p. 5 and December 
26, 1956, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily World, 2 November 1956, p. 4 and December 
12, 1957, p. 4; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 16 March 1957, 
p. 8; Philadelphia Afro-American, 17 November 1957, p. 4, November 24, 1956, p. 4, 
December 1, 1956, p. 4, December 8, 1956, p. 4, December 22, 1957, p. 4, December 29, 
1956, p. 12, January 12, 1957 p. 4, January 26, 1957, p. 4, and March 2, 1957, p. 2; and 
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, pp. 8 & 10, December 8, 1956, p. 9, December 
22, 1956, p. 4, January 8, 1957, p. 4, and February 9, 1957, p. 9 
^-'^Philadelphia Afro-American, 26 January 1957, p. 4. 
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were... molested equally as brutally. What 
are we doing to relocate them?'^^ 
While the Suez Crisis provided black Americans v^th the most visible and well-
known comparison to Hungary, they also pointed to many other examples of what they 
perceived as American indifference and/or hostility toward the fight of dark-skinned 
nations for their freedom. Black Americans also drew unfavorable comparisons between 
the United States' response to the Hvmgarian Revolt and its very different reaction to the 
Mau Mau Revolt in Kenya. Black Americans viewed the Mau Mau's struggle as a 
justified response on the part of the native population to a long history of abuse and 
oppression at the hands of Great Britain. Since the turn of the century, Britain had 
systematically robbed the native Kikuyus of the best land and forced them into the status 
of second-class citizens. In the years following World War II, the Mau Mau, a rebel 
organization seeking an independent Kenya, sought to entirely rid Kenya of white rule. 
From 1952 to 1954, Britain set out to destroy this organization and put down the larger 
more widespread demands for change with incredible ruthlessness and brutality. In their 
efforts to quell the rebellion, British forces imprisoned, tortured, and killed thousands of 
native Kenyans. 
The picture that Great Britain presented to the world, however, was that the Mau 
Mau were savages, and that Britain had simply acted out of necessity. Black Americans 
argued that the general American public seemed not to question Britain's portrayal of 
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 16. 
'-^Plummer, Rising Wind, pp. 239-241. 
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events, if it even paid any heed to this crisis at all. Black Americans questioned why 
Kenyans, who like Hungarians, fought to be free of foreign domination were seen as 
savages and not as freedom fighters. Blacks Americans went on to question why no one 
suggested that thousands of Kenyans be lifted from the hands of their oppressors and 
brought to the United States as refugees.George Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier 
reminded Americans of the "hapless Kikiyu people vegetating in Kenya concentration 
camps." Schuyler went on to inquire: "Is there a home here for them?'"^^ P.L. Prattis, 
also of the Pittsburgh Courier, suggested that maybe the reason for the differing response 
to Hungary and Kenya lay in the United States government's and the general public's 
belief that "the murder of African natives is an internal affair, not genocide."*^' 
The continued riots and protests that accompanied Algeria's quest for 
independence from France provided black Americans with yet another a case by which to 
measure American concern for Hungary against its reaction to similar events in Africa. 
The French had been an unwelcome presence in Algeria since 1830, when their rule was 
established by conquest. France, however, continually maintained that Algeria formed an 
equal and integral part of the French nation. The political, social, and economic 
'^^"Looking and Listening...Practicing Hypocrisy," The Crisis (February 1957): 
pp. 89-90; Amsterdam News, 15 December 1957, p. 17, Philadelphia Afro-American, 1 
December 1956, p. 4, December 12, 1956, p. 4, and December 22, 1956, p. 4; and 
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 8, December 8, 1956, p. 9, January 8, 1957, p. 
10, January 26, 1957, p. 9, and February 9, 1957, p. 9. 
^Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 9. 
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 8. 
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inequality of the native Algerian population, however, seemed to belie the French 
assertions of "equality" and "assimilation." In the early 1950s, the longstanding 
discontent simmering just below the surface in Algeria erupted into a violent full-scale 
nationalist revolt. As in other revolts and wars involving African nations, the sympathies 
of most articulate black Americans lay with the native population. In November 1956, an 
editorial in the Pittsburgh Courier argued that black Americans saw "no difference 
between Hungary's right to be free from Russian domination and Algeria's right to be 
free from French rule."'^° William Worthy of the Philadelphia Afro-American declared 
that Soviet satellites, Alabama, and Algeria all had one thing in common: "After long 
periods of suffering the people are refusing to be lackeys any longer.""' 
Black Americans further believed that, unlike in Hungary, the United States did 
not wholly side with those who fought for freedom in Algeria.George M. Houser of 
the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) argued that the United States had "implicitly 
backed the French in the Algerian conflict."'^^ The belief among black Americans that 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 17 November 1956, p. 4. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 3 November 1956, p. 23. 
^^^Associated Negro Press, 2 January 1957, Features, p. 9 and February 27, 1957, 
Deadline, p. 6; Atlanta Daily World, 5 January 1957, p. 6 and February 13, 1957, p. 3; 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 3 November 1956, p. 23, November 17, 1956, p. 4, and 
December 8, 1956, p. 4; Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2; and "Practicing 
Hypocrisy," p. 89. 
'^^To back up this assertion, Houser pointed to a March 1956 statement by C. 
Douglas Dillon, American ambassador to France, in which Dillon agreed with French 
officials that "the four departments of Algeria are French territory." Houser further 
asserted that the United States government had lent France helicopters, which France then 
utilized against Algerian nationalists. See Draft ACOA Policy on Algeria, George M. 
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their nation cared little about Algeria, while it poured forth its sympathy for Hungary, can 
be seen in the words of Alice A. Dunnigan of the Associated Negro Press. In discussing 
the admission of the Hungarian refugees, Dunnigan sarcastically commented on what she 
saw as American indifference to events in Algeria: "As America extends open arms to 
the Hungarians..what about...lending a little sympathy to the black [emphasis added] 
citizens of revolt-torn Algeria.'"^'* A reader of the Pittsburgh Courier even more directly 
questioned whether race determined where America's sympathies lay. Referring to the 
tremendous outpouring of support for Hungary's fi-eedom fighters, this reader demanded 
to know: "Is this freedom...labeled or colored...If not, then why are we so mum for 
freedom of...Algerians?"'^' 
The situation in South Africa provided black Americans with yet another instance 
by which to measxire the United States' action on behalf of Hungary against inaction 
when it came to dark-skinned peoples. White rule had been a de facto reality in South 
Afnca since the late nineteenth century. However, it was not until the May 1948 election 
of Daniel Malan and his Nationalist Party that South Africa embarked upon the official 
and very brutal policy of strict segregation of the races which came to be known as 
apartheid. Under apartheid, black South Africans had little to no political or economic 
Houser to the Executive and Advisory Boards of the ACOA, April 13, 1956, Africa: 
American Committee. 1954-1969 (and undated). Reel 3, The Papers of A. Philip 
Randolph (Bethesda: University Publications of America). 
Associated Negro Press, 2 January 1957, Features, p. 9. 
^^^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2. 
rights. Anyone who dared oppose this blatantly unjust system faced jail or even death. 
The recentness of events, combined with the growing identification of many black 
Americans with colored nations, pushed South Africa into the forefront of black 
Americans' overseas concerns. It was only natural therefore, that many in the black 
media drew upon America's policies and attitudes toward South Afnca for comparisons 
to the Himgarian Crisis. 
Many individuals in the black media, as well as the general public, argued that 
the brutalities in South Afnca received little attention either from the United States 
government or the mainstream media. In an editorial to the Norfolk Journal and Guide, 
Dr. Wendell C. Somerville maintained that black Americans did, in fact, understand their 
fellow Americans concern for Hungary.'^' Somerville, however, also pointed out that 
such displays of empathy would seem far less hypocritical to black Americans if 
extended to "all peoples of every land who are victims of cruel oppression." Somerville 
concluded by reminding his fellow Americans that: "Freedom means freedom, even to 
'^^For a description of the emergence of apartheid see Thomas Borstelmann, 
Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and South Africa in the Early Cold War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. vii & viii & 3-4. 
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17, December 22, 1956, p. 25, and 
December 25, 1956, p. 6, Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9, 
December 31, 1956, Deadline, p. 5, January 2, 1957, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily 
World, 1 January 1957, p. 6 and January 5, 1957, p. 6; Norfolk Journal and Guide 
(National-Virginia Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6; Philadelphia Afro-American, 8 
December 1956, p. 4, December 12, 1956, p. 4, and January 5, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh 
Courier. 8 January 1957, p. 10, January 12, 1957, p. 2, and February 2, 1957, p. 8. 
the people of Africa."'^^ The juxtaposition of the Hungarian Crisis with apartheid in 
South Africa could also be seen on a sign commemorating Himian Rights Day in 1956. 
This sign, photographed by the Amsterdam News, bore a slogan which illustrated the 
irritation of black Americans with what they perceived as the exclusive and excessive 
attention paid to Hungary: "On Human Rights Day - Let Us Pray for Hungary and South 
Africa!!"'^' 
The Chicago Defender contrasted the American treatment of Hungary with its 
treatment of South Africa in the United Nations. The Defender argued that, while the 
United States actively sought to place the situation in Hungary before the UN, it failed to 
support similar attempts on behalf of black South Africans. In its editorial column, "Our 
Opinions," the Defender pointed out that United States representatives had either 
abstained from voting, or actively opposed, every attempt by the Afro-Asian block to 
place the internal problems in South Africa on the General Assembly's agenda. This 
editorial compared these actions to the repeated efforts by Henry Cabot Lodge to secure 
the presence of UN observers in Himgary. The Defender went on to argue that if the 
United Nations' charter allowed for the presence of UN observers in Himgary, then it 
should also allow for the presence of observers in South Africa: "Either the [G]eneral 
[A]ssembly has the authority to consider domestic policies that come clearly within the 
purview of human rights or it does not...inquiry into the racial policy of the Union is as 
^^^Norfolk Journal and Guide (Virginia-National Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6. 
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25. 
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legitimate..as that proposed for Hungary."""' 
The Chicago Defender also reached further back in history for a case by which to 
consider the United States' reaction to the invasion of Hungary against its reaction to 
similar events in an African nation. Though it occurred two decades earlier, Benito 
Mussolini's brutal invasion of Ethiopia provided some of the best parallels to the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary. Like Hungary, Ethiopia had mounted a brave, but ultimately rather 
futile defense. In a manner similar to Imre Nagy, Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian emperor, 
had turned to the international conraiunity for its assistance. In a November 17, 1956 
issuance of its "Our Opinions" column, the Defender compared the United States 
government's prompt introduction of UN resolutions and heavy use of moral influence on 
behalf of Hungary with its haste to enact neutrality legislation and avoid any and all 
involvement in the 1935 Ethiopian Crisis. This editorial asserted that, though not an 
official member of the League of Nations in the 1930s, the United States could have, and 
should have, employed its tremendous moral influence to initiate punitive international 
action against Italy. Had America done so, the Defender argued, then Mussolini might 
have been forced into an untenable international position and withdrawn his troops."'" 
Black Americans further pointed out that they were virtually alone in their efforts 
to help the Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression. The efforts of black Americans in the 
1930s on behalf of Ethiopia, in fact, bore a striking resemblance to that of white 
^^^Chicago Defender, 15 December 1956, p. 9. 
^'^^Chicago Defender, 17 November 1956, p. 9. 
lA 
Americans in the 1950s on behalf of Himgary. Unlike the later response to the Hungarian 
Crisis, most Americans in the 1930s feared war more than they sympathized with the 
victims of invasion. An anonymous editorial in the Chicago Defender presented a highly 
imfavorable comparison of the American public's very warm and sympathetic response to 
the Hungarian refugees with what many black Americans saw as a lack of concern for the 
Ethiopian victims of Mussolini's invasion. This editorial coldly noted that "no one 
seemed to get excited about help or 'safe haven' for the Ethiopians when Benito 
Mussolini...crushed these helpless and defenseless people."'"*^ Black Americans believed 
that, though other factors influenced America's reaction to the two crisis, race once again 
played the deciding role in dictating when and where Americaiis would act on behalf of 
victims of aggression.'"^ The Associated Negro Press recalled how "Ethiopia was 
ravished and raped by the Italians." The Associated Negro Press then, somewhat 
sarcastically, questioned where "was the inclination of big-hearted American to enact 
emergency aid relief to the starving, destitute and dying black [emphasis added] people 
there?'""" 
For black Americans, the same "color line" that existed in international affairs 
also characterized events at home. In addition to comparing the struggle of colonial 
^'^^Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957, p. 10. 
^^^Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17; Associated Negro Press, 26 
December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily World, 26 December 1956, p. 4 and 
February 26, 1957, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957, p. 10; and Philadelphia 
Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 19. 
Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9. 
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peoples to the events in Hungary, black Americans also drew analogies between their 
own struggle and that of Hungary. The crisis in Hungary came just as the Civil Rights 
Movement had began to emerge. Their own struggles against the force of oppression at 
home led many black Americans to equate their fight against Jim Crow with the 
Hungarians' fight against communist rule. At the NAACP's 48th Annual Convention, 
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, noted that black Americans foimd little "discernible 
difference between the dictatorship of skin color in certain of the Southern States and the 
dictatorship of communism in Hungary.'"'*^ Those in the black media, in fact, often 
referred to the South as the "cotton curtain." The Atlanta Daily World argued that the 
continued existence of this "cotton curtain" constituted a force as "strong and cruel and 
different from true democracy as the Russian Iron Curtain."'"^ 
Many leading figures in the black media and improvement organizations pointed 
out that the tactics used by racists to maintain Jim Crow rule were just as, if not more, 
brutal than those used by Soviet troops to preserve Russian domination in Hungary. To 
illustrate their case, they pointed to the riots, beatings, bombings, and even murders that 
"•^Gloster B. Current, "At the Crossroad - and Beyond," The Crisis (August-
September 1957): p. 435 and "Address of Roy Wilkins, New York City, executive 
secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, at closing 
mass meeting of 48th Annual NAACP Convention, Olympia Stadium, Detroit, Mich., 
June 30, 1957, 3 PM, EST," p. 3 in 1957 Speeches, Annual Convention File, NAACP 
Administration 1956-65, Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Supplement to Part I - 1956-1960 (Bethesda: University Publication of 
America), [hereafter cited as NAACP Papers - 1956-1960] 
Atlanta Daily World, 30 October 1956, p. 6. 
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accompanied black Americans' struggle for Civil Rights. Numerous articles and 
editorials described how efforts to desegregate schools in Clinton, Tennessee brought out 
white mobs that violently harassed black students, destroyed the property of local blacks, 
beat a sympathetic white minister, and eventually even blew up the school itself. The 
brutal murder of fourteen year old Emmett Till for allegedly whistling at a white woman 
provided the black media with a vivid and terrible incident to compare with Soviet 
actions in Himgary. Black newspapers also pointed accusingly toward Montgomery, 
Alabama, where white racists beat men, women, and children; bombed the homes of local 
Black ministers; and shot up buses."*' For many black Americans, these incidents, and 
countless others like them, clearly demonstrated that racial violence in the United States 
constituted an "evil not less despicable than that in Himgary.'""^ 
Black Americans compared the speed with which the Eisenhower administration 
aided the Himgarian Revolt with what they perceived to be the administration's rather 
147" 1956 Annual Report of the Washington Bureau," p. 3 and "The NAACP In 
1956 By Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, Report to the Annual Meeting, January 7, 
1957, National Office, New York City," (both in Annual Meeting - General 1956-58, 
General Office File, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960; Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, 
p. 16; Associated Negro Press, 28 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9; Atlanta Daily World, 30 
October 1956, p. 6 and December 4, 1957, p. 6; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Carolina 
Edition), 2 February 1957, pp. 1-2 and February 16, 1957, p. 4; Norfolk Journal and 
Guide (Home Edition), 2 January 1957, pp. 1-2; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-
Virginia Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6, January 19, 1957, p. 8, and February 16, 1957, p. 
3; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Pennsylvania Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 5 and February 
2, 1957, pp. 1-2; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Portsmouth Edition), 2 January 1957, pp. 1-
2; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, pp. 4 & 19, January 26, 1957, p. 4, 
February 16, 1957, p. 4, and February 23, 1957, p. 4. 
Atlanta Daily World, 30 October 1956, p. 6. 
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slow and timid action on the problem of racial violence in the South."*' The Courier 
Press Service reported that "thousands of Negroes are puzzled about the tremendous 
interest being shown by the federal government in the plight of Hungarian refugees while 
the homes of Negroes in Alabama and other U.S. towns have been bombed and blasted 
without the criminals being apprehended.'"^" The black media pointed out that many 
leading Negro newspapers had seen Eisenhower as a potential champion of their cause, 
and encouraged their readers to vote for him based on his assumption.'^' A black women 
from Virginia wrote an angry letter to Eisenhower declaring: I voted for you...I think 
your duty lies right here in America...All over the United States there are injustices being 
done to Negroes, and you have to worry about Hungary.'"^^ 
""Mrs. Gwendolyn Moore to President Eisenhower, December 18, 1956 and Mr. 
L.A. Jaramillo to President Eisenhower, January 13, 1957 (both in President Letters 
Received (1-3), Box 8, Records of the President's Committee on Hvmgarian Refugee 
Relief, Eisenhower Library; Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Associated Negro 
Press, 28 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9 and February 20,1957, Deadline, p. 12; Chicago 
Defender, 2 February 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January 1957, p. 2 £ind 
January 26, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2, January 26, 1957, 
p. 11, February 2, 1957, p. 8, and February 9, 1957, p. 9. 
^^°Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2. 
'^'A number of leading Black newspapers including the Norfolk Journal and 
Guide, Virginia; Baltimore Afro-American, Maryland; Amsterdam News, New York City; 
Black Dispatch, Oklahoma City; Negro Labor News, Houston; Louisiana Weekly, New 
Orleans; Omaha Guide, Nebraska; Tri-State Defender, Memphis; The Philadelphia 
Independent', Carolina Times, Durham; Wilmington Journal, North Carolina; and 
Cleveland Call and Post, Ohio urged their readers to vote for Eisenhower in 1956. In 
addition, Adam Clayton Powell, a leading black Democrat, also broke with his party to 
endorse Eisenhower's candidacy for President. 
'^^Mrs. Gwendolyn Moore to President Eisenhower, December 18, 1956. 
The Eisenhower administration's response to the Hungarian crisis provided black 
Americans with many examples of just what steps could be taken to promote civil rights 
and put an end to the violence sweeping across the South. The Eisenhower 
administration had repeatedly issued statements demanding an immediate end to the 
Soviet Union's violence against Himgary. On January 11,1957 a group of prominent 
Southern black leaders urged Eisenhower to utilize the "weight of his office" similarly on 
behalf of the Southern Negro. These leaders begged Eisenhower to come to the South 
and personally speak out against the violence and continued defiance of the Supreme 
Court's desegregation orders. However, black Americans soon realized that no such visit 
would be forthcoming.'^^ An editorial in the Philadelphia Afro-American sarcastically 
suggested that "he [Eisenhower] might well have been to busy arranging further aid and 
refuge to the oppressed Htmgarians.'"^" 
In addition to denoimcing the Soviet Union, Eisenhower had sent his Vice-
President, Richard Nixon, to Austria to report on the conditions of the Hungarian 
refugees and provide suggestions for their relief. The same leaders who pressed for 
Eisenhower to denounce racism and violence also hoped that Nixon could travel to the 
South and issue a report similar to what he had done with regards to the Hungarian 
Associated Negro Press, 14 February 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia Afro-
American, 26 January 1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4, and February 16, 1957, p. 4; and 
Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 11. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 26 January 1957, p. 4. 
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refugees.'^' Numerous articles and editorials throughout the black press repeated this 
suggestion. A Courier reader writing from San Antonio, Texas demanded to know why 
"if Mr. Nixon has traveled thousands of miles to look in on the Hungarian situation... [he] 
can't...travel just a few hundred miles to look in on the Alabama situation."'^^ Black 
Americans viewed Nixon's, like Eisenhower's, failure to make a personal tour of the 
South as illustrative of the administration's obsession with events overseas at the expense 
of neglecting important domestic matters.'^' 
While most black Americans accused the Eisenhower administration of inaction, 
rather than any real animosity toward their cause, they could also point to staunch 
advocates of Jim Crow among the many supporters of Himgarian refugee relief. In many 
respects, James O. Eastland, a Democratic Senator from Mississippi, epitomized 
Dixiecrat racism. On numerous occasions, Eastland loudly condemned the Supreme 
Court's desegregation orders and even accused the Court being an instrument of 
communism. Yet this same man, according to many in the black press, actively and 
'^^No copy of the original request was found. However, The Bayard Rustin 
Papers contain a February 14, 1957 second request, again making specific reference to 
Hungary. See Telegram from the Southern Negro Leaders Conference to Vice-President 
Richard Nixon, February 14, 1957 in General Correspondence, 1943-1987, Reel 20, The 
Bayard Rustin Papers (Bethesda; University Publications of America). 
^^^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2. 
Associated Negro Press, 14 FebruEiry 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia Afro-
American, 19 January 1957, pp. 1-2, January 26, 1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4, and 
February 16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2 and February 9, 
1957, p. 9. 
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wholeheartedly supported the admission of thousands of Hungarian refugees."^ In a brief 
column entitled, "No Room to Talk," the Philadelphia Afro-American scomfiilly noted 
that "James O. Eastland, Mississippi's dixiecrat gift to the United States Senate, is all 
heated up over the situation in Hungary." The Afro reminded its readers of the brutal 
murder of Emmett Till. It then pointed out that Eastland failed to express any outrage at 
this terrible crime, which occurred much closer to home.'^® This column concluded by 
contending that protests against Russian aggression in Hungary "have a hollow ring 
indeed when made by men like Senator Eastland."'^" 
Representative Francis Walter, Republican from Pennsylvania, received similar, 
though somewhat less strident, criticism from the black community for his participation 
in America's Hungarian relief effort. The Associated Negro Press pointed out that 
throughout his career Walter had consistently opposed any relaxation of immigration 
standards, particularly those affecting "brown-skinned peoples." Now, however, this 
once adamant opponent of relaxed immigration standards stood up to champion the cause 
of Hungary's rebels. After witnessing the shooting of fleeing Himgarians by the Soviets, 
Walter returned home with the recommendation that rather than tapering off Hungarian 
immigration, the United States should, instead, accept more refiagees than it had 
^^^AssociatedNegro Press, 5 December 1956, Features, pp. 15-16; Atlanta Daily 
World, 6 January 1957, p. 3; Norfi)lk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 12 
January 1957, p. 9; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4. 
'^^Emmett Till was lynched in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi. 
^^Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4. 
81 
originally planned.'^' Upon hearing the news of Walter's change of heart, a black citizen 
from Philadelphia commented that: "1 don't remember Mr. Walter becoming outraged at 
the murder of a boy in Mississippi.'"" 
Black Americans also pointed accusingly toward the attitude of the American 
people in general. The public loved the notion of doing whatever it could to help the 
Hungarians. Rather than having to be pushed and prodded by their government to help 
out, the public actually dragged a somewhat reluctant administration into providing 
increased aid. The majority of voices in Congress and the media spoke out 
sympathetically on behalf of the Hungarians. Churches, charitable institutions, and the 
general public all gave very willingly of their time and money to assist the Hungarians in 
any maimer they could. Everywhere they looked, black Americans saw their fellow 
citizens exhorting the government to do even more to help the Hungarians. However, 
black Americans argued that these same individuals and groups tended to be at best 
apathetic, and at worst resentful, toward the cries for help from Southern Negroes.'" Lin 
Holloway, of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, noted that: "It is gratifying to see 
Associated Negro Press" 5 December 1956, Features, pp. 15-16 and 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4 and March 9,1957, p. 4. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4. 
^^^Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 16 and December 22, 1956, p. 5; 
Associated Negro Press, 30 January 1957, Deadline, pp. 6-7; Atlanta Daily World, 25 
November 1956, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9; Norfolk Journal and 
Guide (Home Edition), 12 January 1957, p. 14; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 
1957, pp. 4 & 19, January 19,1957, p. 4, January 26,1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4, 
February 9, 1957. p. 4, and February 16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 
1957, p. 2 and February 2, 1957, p. 8. 
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Americans rallying to the aid of oppressed people in Hungary. Such a wide-spread 
interest in the welfare of humans may soon spread to Dixieland.'"^ In the Chicago 
Defender, Langston Hughes utilized his imaginary character ("Simple") to express his 
disgust: "With all this..ain't-it-a-shame about the Hungarians, there is nary a word 
about...the Negroes that cannot vote in Mississippi.'"®^ At a convention for the National 
Committee for Rural Schools, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. also registered his disapproval 
of the public's attitude: "Americans are so concerned about the Hungarians - but it is 
strange that they have not the slightest concern about the Negroes in Mississippi and 
Alabama."'®^ 
Many in the black press argued that the mainstream media and entertainment 
world also deserved criticism for their inattention to the fight of black America, 
especially in contrast with their enthusiasm for the struggle in Hungary.'®^ Baker E. 
Morton, radio and television commentator for the Associated Negro Press, accused the 
media of "going overboard for drama growing out of Hungary's plight while ignoring the 
same drama right under their noses in the Negro plight.'"®® Morton pointed to the rash of 
Norfolk Journal and Guide (Home Edition), 12 January 1957, p. 14. 
^^^Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9. 
^^Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 5. 
Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9, December 31, 
1956, Deadline, pp. 8-9, February 6, 1957, Features, pp. 12-13, and March 13, 1957, 
Features, p. \ \-, Atlanta Daily World, 26 December 1956, p. 4 and January 3, 1957, p. 2; 
and Philadelphia Afro-American, 12 January 1957, p. 4. 
^^^Associated Negro Press, 31 December 1956, Deadline, p. 9. 
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stories about Hungary airing on television with dramatic titles such as "Flight from 
Budapest" and "Passport to Life." He further pointed to how effectively radio and 
television producers employed their mediums to highlight the Hungarians' quest for 
freedom. Morton argued that radio and television could, and should, be used with equal 
zeal to attack racial oppression and hatred in America. The Philadelphia Afro-American 
expressed similar regrets that the American media remained "too busy watching Europe 
to note that an identical struggle was taking place right here." In particular, the Afro took 
issue with Time's selection of the Hungarian freedom fighter as "Man of the Year." The 
Afro declared that "our choice would have been a freedom fighter, too...the Rev. Martin 
Luther King, Jimior."'®' 
Black observers went on to point out that in the eyes of the American media and 
general public alike, Hungarians who used force to defy their oppressors were heroes. 
The NAACP's Roy Wilkins contrasted this attitude with that of many Americans toward 
even peaceful Negro resistance: "When Hungarians resist oppression they are called 
heroes, when American Negroes...peacefully resist oppression they are called 
agitators.""" America exhorted its black citizens to be patient and move cautiously in 
their quest for freedom and equality. This attitude existed even among the black 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 12 January 1957, p. 4. 
'^Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 435 and Wilkins' Address at 48th Annual 
Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960. 
community and white supporters of civil rights.''' Hungarians, however, received 
immense cheering and support when they attempted to seize their freedom with force. 
The Chicago Defender pointed out that at the same time America rushed to commend 
Hungary's freedom fighters; "We have native fighters for freedom...to whom no word of 
sympathy or encouragement is extended.'"'^ Black Americans demanded to known why 
the Hungarians' fight against tyranny and oppression deserved all the cheers and 
accolades, when so many Americans remained either hostile or indifferent to the equally 
courageous fight of black Americans at home.'" A Pittsburgh Courier reader from San 
Antonio, Texas angrily noted the respective response of Americans to the Hungarians' 
and Negroes' struggles for freedom: "On every newscast and in every newspaper, the 
Hungarians are being praised and lauded for their...fight...against enslaved 
conditions...While...instead of being praised...we are being bombed and shot at like clay 
"'In his "Letter From Birmingham Jail" of April 16,1963 King utilized the 
Hvmgarian Revolution, among other examples, to address the fears of some of his fellow 
clergymen regarding his acts of civil disobedience. No doubt remembering the intense 
displays of support for Himgary's dissidents. King defended the use of civil disobedience 
in the fight for equality by declaring: "There is nothing new about this kind of civil 
disobedience...We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did...was 'legal' and 
everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did...was 'illegal.'" See Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Why We Can't Wait (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 86-87. 
"^Chicago Defender, 2 February 1957, p. 9 
^''^Chicago Defender, 27 January 1957, p. 9 and February 2, 1957, p. 9; 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4; Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 
1956, p. 8, January 8, 1957, p. 8, and January 12, 1957, p. 2; Current, "At the Crossroad," 
p. 435; and Wilkins' Address at 48th Annual Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP 
Papers - 1956-1960. 
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pigeons.'"'"' 
In addition to comparing the action of America's civil rights leaders to Hungary's 
freedom fighters, black Americans also compared Southern Negroes fleeing racial 
violence to Hungarians fleeing Russian troops. The Philadelphia Afro-American reported 
on a address given by a Reverend J. Herbert Nelson to students at Allen University. In 
this address. Nelson held the Reverend J.A. DeLaine, who fled South Carolina in the face 
of violent reprisals for his efforts to desegregate schools in Clarendon County, up as an 
example of the "classic refugee." Nelson went on the declare that: "No Hungarian loves 
liberty and freedom more than J.A. DeLaine.""^ Many throughout the black press and 
public questioned why no relief programs were extended to such colored "refugees." 
These critics noted that when Southern Negroes, like DeLaine, moved North to escape 
the violence, they often encountered irritated Northerners who ignored their plight, or 
quietly shunted them off to the de facto segregation and ghettos that existed in most urban 
areas. The Amsterdam News pointed out that a "Hungarian who slips out of Budapest...is 
called a 'freedom fighter.' The Negro who slips away from a lynch town...and arrives in 
Detroit or Chicago...is apt to be regarded as 'a problem.'"'^ Such attitudes reinforced the 
deepening conviction of black Americans that their nation cared more about white 
^''^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January 1957, p. 5. 
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 4. 
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foreigners than its Negro citizens.'"''' 
Black Americans who flocked to the Hungarian cause, without first establishing 
themselves as defenders of their own people, did not escape censure by the black 
community. Louis Armstrong, the famous trumpet player, received harsh criticism for 
his role in the Hungarian relief effort. The focus of black Americans' criticism involved 
Armstrong's benefit concert in London on December 18, 1956. Armstrong canceled 
already scheduled appearances in the United States, paid all his own expenses, and 
donated the entire proceeds, some 14,000 dollars, toward Hungarian refugee relief Baker 
E. Morton pointed out that he "never recalled 'Satch'...advocating Negro relief""^ The 
criticism of Armstrong in the black media had its roots in his frequent appearances before 
white, segregated audiences in the South. One Southern black from McCain, North 
Carolina questioned how "Southern bom" Armstrong could "put Hungary before the 
colored man and forget that charity begins at home."'^' These and other critics demanded 
to know when, or even if, Armstrong plaimed on giving a similar benefit performance on 
behalf of the Civil Rights Movement.'*" 
"'W.W. Hensel to President Eisenhower, February 20, 1957, President Letters 
Received (1-3), Box 8, Records of the President's Committee on Hungarian Refugee 
Relief, Eisenhower Library; Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 4; Associated Negro 
Press, 26 December 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January 
1957, p. 5 and February 23, 1957 p. 4; Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 435; and Wilkins' 
Address at 48th Annual Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960. 
Associated Negro Press, 6 February 1957, Features, p. 13. 
^''^Philadelphia Afro-American, 23 March 1957, p. 4. 
^^^AssociatedNegro Press, 6 February 1957, Features, pp. 12-13 and Philadelphia 
Afro-American, 9 March 1957, p. 4, March 23, 1957, p. 4, and March 30, 1957, p. 4. 
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Aside from feeling hurt and abandoned that their nation seemed to care more 
about the Hungarians than its own black citizens, many black Americans also feared the 
potential economic impact of such a large number of white immigrants. Harkening back 
to the bitter competition between Negroes and white irrunigrants at the turn of the 
century, George Schuyler pointed out that "European immigration has never been helpfiil 
to the American Negro historically."'*' By the 1950s, black Americans, while still facing 
intense job discrimination and frequent unemployment, had slowly began to move up the 
economic ladder. Much of their opposition to the Hungarian refugees arose from the fear 
that they would again lose the economic gains they had so recently acquired.'*^ Black 
Americans could not help but notice the eagerness with which their fellow Americans 
offered the Himgarians employment opportunities of all kinds. This awareness, 
combined with the precarious natvire of their own economic status, caused a substantial 
number of black Americans to view the admission of thousands of Hungarians with 
imeasy suspicion.'*^ The National Urban League, which had historically concentrated it 
Pittsburgh Courier, January 26, 1957, p. 9. 
'^^The fear that Himgarian immigration would have an adverse economic effect on 
black Americans had the most basis in fact in the Cleveland area. Of the approximately 
32,000 Hungarian refugees granted asylum in the United States, over 10,000 settled in 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14; Associate Negro Press, 5 December 
1957, Features, pp. 15-16 and February 20, 1957, Deadline, p. 12; Atlanta Daily World, 
25 November 1956, p. 4 and January 19, 1957, p. 3; Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957, 
p. 10 and February 23, 1957, p. 10; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia 
Edition), 26 January 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4, and 
March 30, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 8, January 12, 
1957, p. 2, January 26, 1957, p. 9, and February 9, 1957, p. 9. 
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efforts on improving the economic status of black Americans, was particularly concerned 
with this issue. Lester Granger, head of the National Urban League, reported the most 
commonly asked question of black workers as being: "Will they [Hungarian refugees] be 
taking our jobs...our promotions?'"^" 
Many black Americans from aroimd the nation also raised the related issue of 
housing. In the 1950s, neighborhoods remained segregated, with whites generally 
occupying the more desirable areas. Those black Americans who could afford to 
purchase a home in a white neighborhood faced tremendous obstacles. Existing owners 
frequently refused to sell, or even show, their homes to Negro buyers. Those who did 
sell, almost always did so at a vastly inflated price. Blacks who did finally move into 
white neighborhoods often faced critical daily scrutiny and complete exclusion from 
neighborhood activities. For most black Americans, however, even this situation usually 
constituted an improvement over the expensive rents and substandard housing so many 
faced. At the same time governmental and private organizations did so much to locate 
decent, affordable housing for the Hungarian refugees, many black Americans lived in 
horrible conditions.'®' One Brooklyn resident wrote to the Amsterdam News complaining 
of the poor state of New York Public Housing. This individual pointed to conditions so 
bad that they actually posed substantial risks to the safety and health of the occupants. 
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14. 
'^'"Looking and Listening...Housing," The Crisis (March 1957): pp. 228-230; 
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, pp. 5 & 14; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 
1957, p.4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 9. 
The writer went on to relate these conditions to attention given by so many, in and out of 
government, to the Hungarians' housing needs. She pointed out that "our leaders look 
out for the refugees " But what, she asked, "about the health, safety and freedom of us 
Negroes here?'"*® 
Black Americans also noted the immense disparity between educational 
opportimities offered to the Hungarian refugees and those denied to themselves. Even 
though Brown v. Board of Education had legally ended segregation in public schools, 
educational equality remained elusive. The Pittsburgh Courier reported on the large 
number of scholarships being offered to the incoming Himgarian refugees. The Courier 
observed that these generous offers came at a time when education for black Americans 
remained woefully imder-funded. The Courier concluded that "evidently it is more 
advantageous to be a Hungarian refugee than a black citizen.'"®^ Furthermore, black 
Americans could not help but feel bitter when they witnessed Hungarian refugees being 
warmly welcomed at the same educational institutions which fought so stubbornly to 
avoid compliance with Brown v. Board of Education.^^^ This bitterness was reflected in 
an unsigned editorial sent in to the Philadelphia Afro-American fi-om a black resident of 
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14. 
Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 9 
'^^Suzanne Smith, "Crisis in the South," The Crisis (January 1957): pp. 5-7; 
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 16; Atlanta Daily World, 1 January 1957, p. 6, 
January 5, 1957, p. 6, and January 19, 1957, p. 3; Chicago Defender, 27 January 1957, p. 
9; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 26 January 1957, p. 9; 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, pp. 4 & 19; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29 
December 1956, p. 9. 
Alabama. This writer reported on the recent admission of a number of Hungarian 
refugees to the University of Alabama. This Alabama native maintained that "good will 
for these aliens pervaded the campus."'®' This writer then went on to point out that such 
hospitality stood in "sharp contrast" to Alabama's treatment of Autherine Lucy."° 
At heart, what bothered most black Americans was that their government and 
fellow Americans seemed to prefer to help white foreigners over American citizens, who 
also happened to be black. Black leaders, columnists, and private individuals all stressed 
that their citizenship and long residence in the United States entitled them, not some 
foreigners, to their nation's primary consideration. Instead, what black Americans saw 
was the rights and privileges their country had so long denied them being handed over 
freely to the newly arriving Hungarians. One black laborer remarked that "these people 
can come here, even without the ability to speak English, and obtain the best jobs...I have 
been here all my life. More than this, I'm an American citizen"'®' In an imaginary 
conversation with a supporter of Hungarian relief Langston Hughes' "Simple" expressed 
similar sentiments. Simple argued that "colored folks have been in this here U.S.A. a 
long time...and yet, you mean to tell me a Hungarian what has been here a half-hour is 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4. 
"°In February 1956 Autherine Lucy became the first Negro to ever attend the 
University of Alabama. Lucy's presence at the University of Alabama was met with 
threats to her life, brutal attacks on faculty who attempted to defend her, and intense 
rioting. Rather than seeking punishment for the perpetrators of such acts, the university 
instead expelled Lucy after only three days of attendance. 
Atlanta Daily World, 25 November 1956, p. 4-
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worth more.""^ Black Americans further pointed out that all the aid to the Hungarians 
cost taxpayer money, including their own."^ Blacks Americans felt it profoundly unfair 
that they should have to pay for services and privileges denied them and given to 
foreigners instead.'^'' 
While black Americans tended to view racial discrimination and violence in 
America as an evil equal to, if not greater than, communism, this equation should not be 
interpreted as indicating any large scale presence of pro-communist sentiments among the 
black population. Rather, most black Americans of the 1950s fell squarely within the 
Cold War consensus. Black Americans, like most other Americans in the 1950s, firmly 
^^^Chicago Defender, 23 February 1957, p. 10. 
'^^Some black Americans angrily pointed to the United States government's plan 
to confiscate the assets of Joe Louis, boxing heavyweight champion of the world, in order 
to satisfy interest and fines on his back taxes. In particular, the govenmient's plan to 
seize the trust fund which Louis had set up for his young children infuriated black 
Americans. For many black Americans, Louis was an icon, and the government's action 
against him an absolute outrage. These critics demanded to know how the U.S. 
government could be so charitable to the Hungarians, and yet cruel enough to impoverish 
one of its most famous black citizens. (Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, 
Features, pp. 14-15 and Philadelphia Afro-American, 22 December 1956, p. 2, December 
29,1956, p. 4, January 5,1957, p. 4, and March 30,1957, p. 4.) 
''"•Mrs. Peggy E. Nimnally to President Eisenhower, December 20, 1956; Mrs. J.F. 
Gene Rees to President Eisenhower, January 12,1957; and Mr. L.A. Jaramillo to 
President Eisenhower, January 13,1957 (all in President Letters Received (1-3), Box 8, 
Records of the President's Committee on Hungarian Refugee Relief, Eisenhower 
Library); Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Atlanta Daily World, 25 November 
1956, p. 4, December 9, 1956, p. 4, January 1, 1957, p. 6, January 19, 1957, p. 3, January 
29, 1957, p. 6; Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9, February 9, 1957, p. 10, and 
February 23, 1957, p. 10; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 26 
January 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 22 December 1956, p. 4 and February 
16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 8, January 1, 1957, p. 10, 
and January 26, 1957, p. 11. 
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Americans, like some white Americans, argued against the admission of the Hungarians 
based on the fear that some might be Soviet spies and communist infiltrators. Some 
black Americans, again like some white Americans, maintained that the vast majority of 
Hungarian refugees had not fought so much against Communism per se, as for 
Nationalist communism and/or socialism."^ 
The editorials of John B. Henderson of the Norfolk Journal and Guide further 
illustrated how black Americans viewed racism as often worse than communism, and yet 
also remained ardently anti-communist. On December 15,1956 in an editorial regarding 
the situation in Hungary, Henderson declared that: "The Communists' true nature stood 
revealed with all of its beastly cruelty and primitive savagery.""^ Then on December 22, 
1956, again in the context of Hungary, Henderson referred to the "oppressive rule of 
Russian communism.'"'^ On January 19 1957, however, he produced another editorial 
which, if taken out of context, might be interpreted as a softening of his earlier position. 
When comparing the tactics used to sustain Jim Crow rule with those used to maintain 
Soviet domination of Hungary he wrote: "The Communists may parade in heavy tanks 
though the cities of Hungary...but they, at least, do it in the daytime so that you know 
Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Atlanta Daily World, 1 January 
1957, p. 1; and Pittsburgh Courier, 8 December 1956, p. 9, January 12,1957, p. 8, 
January 26,1957, p. 9, February 2, 1957, p. 8, and March 2, 1957, p. 9. 
Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 15 December 1956, p. 
8. 
Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 22 December 1956, p. 
8. 
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what they are and can fight back. Communists don't hide under the cover of darkness 
and hurl bombs at churches and residences.'"'® Rather than viewing this statement, or 
similar statements by other black leaders and media figures, as a change of heart or as 
containing any pro-Soviet sympathies whatsoever, it should interpreted as the stem 
indictment of Jim Crow it was meant to be."' 
Black Americans also remained keenly aware of the interconnected nature of the 
United States' racial problems, its international image, and the Cold War. A number of 
black Americans pointed out that if America ever hoped to maintain credibility, 
particularly with the Afro-Asian block, than it must make an effort to "aid all nations not 
just white" and "clean up its own backyard."^"" On December 29, 1956 the Philadelphia 
Afro-American reported on how Pravda, the Soviet Union's official newsletter, 
responded to the Eisenhower administration's condenmation of Soviet actions in Hungary 
with its own charge that: "The United States does not ensure elementary human rights in 
its own country."^'" In Fight for Freedom, Langston Hughes also pointed to the "field 
^^^Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 19 January 1957, p. 8. 
•''It should be further noted that Henderson also compares white racists to bank 
robbers and other similarly despicable types. 
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1957, p. 16; Associated Negro Press: 5 
December 1956, Deadline, p. 7, December 26, 1956, Features, pp. 8-9, January 30, 1957, 
Deadline, pp. 6-7, February 20, 1957, Deadline, p. 12, and February 27, 1957, Deadline, 
p. 6, Atlanta Daily World, 9 December 1956, p. 4, January 5, 1957, p. 6, and February 
20, 1957, p. 2; Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 2 and January 5, 
1957, p. 2; Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 431; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 157-158; 
and "Practicing Hypocrisy," pp. 89-90. 
Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 2. 
day" Iron Curtain countries were having with reports of racial violence in the South. 
When the United States condemned the puppet regime of Janos Kadar, Kadar simply 
replied that: "Those who tolerate that a people should be persecuted because of the color 
of their skin have no right to preach...liberty and human rights to others.Hughes also 
reported on a similar statement by Bulgaria's UN representative. When Ceylon's 
representative finally came around to joining in America's censure of Himgary, the 
Bulgarian delegate reminded him that: "Something worse could happen to you today if 
you went to Little Rock."^°^ 
There were those within the black commxmity, aside from 
Louis Armstrong, who voiced their support and/or provided aid to the Himgarian 
refugees. At the urging of the Red Cross, a select group of black leaders issued 
statements of support for Hungarian relief. These leaders included such prominent 
figures in the black community as Dr. Channing H. Tobias, Chairman of the NAACP; J. 
Emest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Alonzo G. Moron, President of Hampton 
Institute; and E. Frederic Morrow, White House Administrative Assistant.^"^ Other black 
^°^Quoted in Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 157-158. 
2°^Ibid., p. 158. 
^"''Newspaper accoimts reported that the statements of support issued by these 
black leaders all came after an appeal from the Red Cross. In a series of correspondence 
with E. Frederic Morrow, the Red Cross indicated that they desperately needed his help to 
"bring to the attention of all Americans this special appeal for Hungeirian relief" None of 
the correspondence mentioned enlisting the support of the black community specifically. 
However, the Red Cross' choice of such well-known black leaders to endorse their 
campaign seemed to indicate that this was in fact the purpose. In addition, with the 
exception of Morrow, there was little indication of any involvement, beyond a mere 
statement of support, on the part of these black leaders. (See Wire from E. Roland 
supporters of Hungarian relief included some Negro branches of the Elks Club, black 
employees of the Manger Hotel in Savannah, and miscellaneous individuals.^"^ Why 
these other scattered black groups and individuals supported Hungarian relief remains 
somewhat unclear.^"' Some supporters, like a yoimg pastor in New Jersey, urged black 
Americans to look beyond their own struggles and "demonstrate that the Negro's fight for 
freedom is unselfish."^°^ The Chicago Defender's "Our Opinions" column also voiced, 
with some hesitation and reservations, support for the Hungarian cause. On December 
22, 1956 this column reminded readers of those white Americans, like William Lloyd 
Garrison and Elijah P. Lovejoy, who had historically helped the Negro cause. This 
editorial went on to argue that black Americans should "set aside their own grievances 
Harriman to E. Frederic Morrow, December 5, 1956; Telegram from E. Frederic Morrow 
to E. Roland Harriman, December 6, 1956; and Letter from E. Roland Harriman to E. 
Frederic Morrow, January 3,1957 (all in Hungarian Relief Program, Box 1, E. Frederic 
Morrow Records, Eisenhower library). 
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25 and December 29, 1956, p. 31; 
Associated Negro Press, 16 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9; Atlanta Daily World, 11 
December 1956, p. 2 and December 22, 1956, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 22 December 
1956, p. 9 and December 29, 1956, p. 8; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Home Edition), 2 
February 1957, p. 3, Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 29 
December 1956, p. 20 and January 19, 1957, p. 11; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 8 
December 1957, p. 18 and December 22, 1957, p. 28. 
^°^lt remains unclear because most newspapers accounts simply reported the 
occurrence of support with little analysis, or even indication, as to what circumstances 
generated such support. In addition, there was no indication, unlike in the case of 
Armstrong, of how these supporters were received by their fellow black Americans. 
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25 
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and woes to lend their might to the cause of Hungarian freedom."^"® 
Of all these supporters, Morrow participated the most directly in the United 
States' refugee relief efforts. In his position as White House Administrative Assistant, 
Morrow played a primary role in the organization of the United States' refugee efforts. It 
was his duty to locate an appropriate headquarters, hire staff, procure and dispense 
supplies, handle billing concerns, and perform numerous other administrative functions 
for Eisenhower's Himgarian Refugee Relief Committee. In his memoir. Black Man in the 
White House, Morrow reported on the difficulties inherent in his dual role as an official 
member of Eisenhower's Hungarian refugee relief team and as a prominent member of 
the black community. Morrow remembered how he initially foimd himself "somewhat 
surprised at the violent Negro reaction...in welcoming Hungarian refugees to this 
country."^"® Morrow discussed how, as member of the President's staff, he felt an 
obligation and a sense of duty to do all he could to help the incoming Himgarian refugees. 
This sense of duty, however, often conflicted with Morrow's realization and 
understanding of the circumstances which generated the unfavorable response of black 
Americans toward Hungarian relief in the first place.^'° Morrow pointed out that: "Deep 
down Negroes are sympathetic...but...how charitable can one expect him to be when he so 
^°^Chicago Defender, 22 December 1956, p. 9. 
Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the While House: A Diary of the Eisenhower 
Years By the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, the White House, 1955-1961 
fNew York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1963), p. 109. 
2'%id.,pp. 109-110. 
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seldom experiences this kind of charity on the part of others?"^" Throughout the 
Hungarian Crisis, black Americans repeatedly expressed their sense of anger and betrayal 
at what they perceived to be inattention to both their own plight and the plight of 
oppressed peoples of the Afro-Asian block. For black Americans, the intense concern for 
the fate of the victims of Soviet aggression in Hungary seemed rather hypocritical when 
placed along-side of inattention to aggression on the part of white colonial powers 
overseas and to Jim Crow within the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the conclusion 
reached by many black leaders, newspapers, and private citizens alike was that "skin-
color" explained this disparity. Why else, many black Americans wondered, would their 
nation rush to help white victims of oppression thousands of miles away, and ignore 
abuses against its own black citizens. Black Americans further argued that, given the 
United States' somewhat lackluster record on human rights, the Afro-Asian block could 
not help but find America's concern for Hungary a bit hypocritical. 
2"Ibid.,p. 109. 
CONCLUSION 
With the exception of the relatively few black Americans who supported aid for 
and admission of the refugees, there remained a remarkable amoimt of consensus within 
the black commimity regarding the Hungarian Crisis. This remarkable imanimity of 
opinion encompassed such important differences as geography and political allegiance. 
Little difference could be seen in the opinion of Northern newspapers, like the 
Amsterdam News, Chicago Defender, and Pittsburgh Courier and Southern newspapers, 
like the Atlanta Daily World and the Norfolk Journal and Guide. Furthermore, there was 
no clear distinction between Democratic newspapers, like the Chicago Defender, and 
Republican papers, like the Pittsburgh Courier. The consensus also encompassed the 
statements of prominent black leaders, regularly featured black columnists and reporters, 
and average black Americans. These diverse groups and individuals expressed emotions 
ranging from mild aimoyance to intense bitterness to their nation's concern and care for 
Hungary's refugees. 
Throughout the Himgarian Crisis, mainstream public opinion argued, implicitly or 
explicitly, that the United States bore some responsibility for the events in Hungary. 
However, nowhere in the comments of black Americans was there any indication of a 
sense that they felt that the United States had any responsibility at all for Hungary's 
troubles. Furthermore, there was very little even mentioned regarding Voice of America, 
Radio Free Europe, or any other American propaganda efforts. Black Americans, 
undoubtedly, were well aware of the existence of such activities. Why black Americans 
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did not express the same sense of quilt and responsibility for their nation's alleged 
culpability in the Hungarian Crisis stands as one of the most intriguing questions left by 
their unique response. One possible explanation may lie in the deep empathy felt by 
black Americans for victims of oppression in the Afro-Asian block, and the 
accompanying belief that their nation bore some responsibility for this oppression. While 
other Americans expressed shock at outrage that their goverrmient did not do more to 
help Hungary, black Americans noted that their government and the American people in 
general did little to help stop, and sometimes even tacitly aided, the past and continued 
exploitation of colored peoples around the world. Perhaps black Americans' intense 
belief that their nation should have felt a sense of guilt and shame for its policy in 
Ethiopia, Algeria, and other similar cases left them with little inclination to consider 
American complicity in Himgary. 
The analogies used by black Americans in criticizing their nation's involvement 
in Hungarian reftigee relief ranged from a rather long stretch to Joe Louis' tax problems, 
to somewhat misguided hero-worship of Gamal Nasser, to glossing over the nuances 
between internal and external aggression in South Africa and Himgary, to some very well 
drawn parallels between the Ethiopia Crisis of 1935 and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956-
1957. While some of the analogies used by black Americans might have fell short when 
examined strictly from the standpoint of their accuracy and logic, they conveyed an 
important underlying disaffection within the black community. For black Americans, 
what Joe Louis, Gamal Nasser, the South Africans, the Ethiopians, and the numerous 
other individuals or nations compared to Hungary all had in common was that they were 
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dark-skinned people facing oppressive and/or xmjust white aggressors. Black Americans 
consistently expressed their belief that their nation simply did not care about colored 
victims of oppression overseas, or even its own black citizens. 
Of all the analogies, the comparison between the tax troubles of Joe Louis and the 
plight of Hungary seemed to have had the least validity. It should be noted, however, that 
the association of Joe Louis with the Hungarian Crisis occurred far more frequently in 
editorials sent in by private citizens than in the writings of regularly featured columnists 
or statements of prominent black leaders. Irrespective of the merits of Louis' case, the 
financial troubles of one very famous black American did not seem to equate with the 
troubles experienced by the Hungarian refugees. Black Americans linked Louis to the 
Hungarian Crisis by implying that there existed a direct connection between the seizure 
of Louis' money to pay back taxes and the money being spent to help the Hungarians. In 
some editorials, this argument almost seemed to degenerate into the implied assertion that 
the government planned to seize the trust fund of Louis' children, just so they could give 
it the incoming refugees. 
While the actions of Britain, France, and Israel did deserve condemnation, the 
comparisons made by black Americans between Hungary and Suez were not entirely 
accurate either. The vast majority of comments found in black newspapers portrayed 
Nasser as a hero and role model for dark-skinned peoples everywhere. Though most 
black Americans were surely aware that Nasser ruled as a military dictator, this fact was 
generally glossed over in the outpouring of praise for his defiance of Britain, France, and 
Israel. Even those black Americans who had some reservations about Nasser still poured 
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forth their sympathies for the common people of Egypt. Black Americans argued that 
thousands of Egyptians were killed, wounded, and made homeless by this "unwarranted 
attack." The praise of Nasser, particularly the comparison with the likes of the Reverend 
Martin Luther King Jr., illustrated the growing pride many black Americans felt when 
they witnessed members of the Afro-Asian block standing up to the old imperial powers 
of Europe. 
The comparison between the Himgarian Revolt and apartheid in South Africa also 
tended to ignore important differences. The brutality of the treatment of South Africa's 
black population was equally as inhimiane as Soviet aggression against Himgary. 
However, the Chicago Defender's line of reasoning regarding UN policy in South Afnca 
versus that in Hungary failed to take into account significant differences between the 
UN's policy regarding internal and external aggression. The Defender argued that: 
"Either the [Gjeneral [A]ssembly has the authority to consider domestic policies 
[emphasis added] that come clearly within the purview of human rights or it does 
not...inquiry into the racial policy of the Union is as legitimate...as that proposed for 
Hungary."^'^ The United Nations' charter did not grant it the power to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of its members.^'^ While the South African government was clearly 
guilty of terrible violations of human rights, apartheid did in fact remain an internal. 
^^^Chicago Defender, 15 December 1956, p. 9. 
-'^Article 2, Section 7 of the United Nation's charter states: "Nothing contained in 
the present charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 
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domestic matter. Hungary, imlike South Africa, was not an issue of "domestic policy" as 
implied by the Defender. The Soviet's invasion was, instead, a clear case of external 
aggression against a member state. The UN's charter did, in fact, grant it the power to act 
in cases, like Hungary, that were obvious examples of external aggression. 
Despite the difference in the isolationism of the 1930s and the internationalism of 
the Cold War, as well as the separation in time and space, the parallels between Ethiopia 
and Hungary remain some of the strongest drawn by black Americans. Unlike the 
comparisons to South Africa, both the Ethiopian and Hungarian Crises constituted clear 
cases of outside invasion, rather than internal violations of hvmian rights. In addition, 
military intervention in either Ethiopia or Hungary would have risked wide-spread 
conflict and loss of American lives. When confi-onted with the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, many Americans actively pressed their government to avoid any American 
involvement. However, as black Americans pointed out, many Americans seemed all to 
willing risk war on behalf of Hungary. Furthermore, the vast majority of Americans in 
the 1930s did little to provide food and medical aid to Ethiopia, much less offers of 
sanctuary. While the public's changing attitude toward America's role in the world, 
rather than racism as was so often suggested, explained the differing response to the 
Ethiopian and Hungarian Crises, black Americans did raise some very valid points. 
No matter what analogy they used, or how well or poorly argued, black 
Americans consistently asserted that race determined when and where their government 
and fellow citizens would allow oppression and injustice to continue. Throughout the 
Hungarian Crisis, black leaders, members of the media, and private citizens alike all 
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asserted that their nation would not have bothered to aid the Hungarians, much less have 
allowed them entry into the United States, had they been colored instead of white. 
Whether or not black Americans' assertion that the United States would not have acted as 
it had toward Himgary had it been an Asian or African nation wholly conveys the totality 
of American foreign policy, it does suggest a lot about the experience of black Americans 
leading up to and during the mid-1950s. Black Americans viewed race as playing a 
primary role in America's policy toward Hxmgary because it occupied such an 
omnipresent force in their own lives. Despite their official status as citizens and their 
long record of service to their nation, the color of their skin continued to determine where 
black Americans could work, live, attend school, and often even who their friends and 
associates would be. 
When the Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
many black Americans felt that, at last, things would be different. As they continued to 
wait for their nation to grant them the privileges inherent in their status as citizens, they 
became increasingly embittered and pessimistic about the future of America's race 
relations. Then, in late 1956, black Americans witnessed their government and fellow 
citizens racing to offer citizenship, housing, and jobs to a group of unknown foreigners. 
This spectacle stirred deep emotions and aroused old feelings of nativism among the 
black commimity. Existing nativism, combined with the climate of the 1950s, generated 
annoyance, disgust, and bitterness on the part of many black Americans toward refugee 
relief efforts. 
Black Americans' reaction to the Hungarian Crisis was not so much a well-
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thought out and organized attempt to prevent the admission of the Hungarian refugees as 
it was a series of emotional statements designed to vent their frustration, express fears, 
and draw greater attention to their own struggle. Evidence of this purpose can be seen in 
where and how black Americans chose to express their opposition to Hungarian refugee 
relief. The vast majority of statements of black opposition appeared in black newspapers. 
The only substantial group of people reading black newspapers in the 1950s were other 
black Americans. Of the himdreds of letters received by Eisenhower, only four or five 
appeared to have been from black Americans.^" Placed alongside of the immense 
coverage of the Hungarian Revolt, these facts seem to indicate that black Americans did 
not truly seek to alter the course of events. Furthermore, few statements by black 
Americans argued that the United States should actually cease aid to Hungary. Most 
black Americans, instead, pointed out that the concern and care given by their nation to 
the situation in Hungary should also be shown on behalf of colored people overseas and 
at home.^'^ Overall, the response of black Americans to the Hungarian Crisis seems to 
have been deeply rooted in their intense frustration with the continuing neglect and poor 
treatment received by both themselves and the peoples of Asia and Africa, rather than any 
^'''If not specifically stated, the assumption of whether or not the writer was black 
was generally based on area of residence and the content of the letter. 
^'^For example, when the Southem Christian Leaders Conference pointed to 
Eisenhower's frequent verbal condemnation of the Soviet Union and Nixon's visit to 
Austria they never once argued that Eisenhower should stop condemning the Soviet 
Union or Nixon should never make a trip overseas to Hungary again. Instead, they 
pointed out that Eisenhower and Nixon could, and should, initiate similar actions on 
behalf of equally oppressed Southem Negroes. 
105 
particular hostility to the Hungarians themselves. 
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